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INTRODUCTION. OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM
The creation of the National Guard of the Russian Federation (FSVNG) 
follows a long tradition of the Russian security services. Periodic reor‑
ganisations involving changes of names, structures and leaders to ‘reset’ 
the service in question have been an important element of this tradition. 
In contrast to the more radical changes that happened in the past, the 
creation of the FSVNG, or Rosgvardiya (the short name also appears in 
official documents) was an evolutionary process1, announced many years 
earlier as part of the efforts to modernise the internal troops and improve 
their efficiency. The provisions of the relevant federal bill and the pres‑
idential decrees governing the operations of the new service, as well as 
the information campaign that accompanied its creation, suggested the 
reform would be technical. Rosgvardiya’s statutory tasks do not differ 
much from the tasks of the Internal Troops and the police formations 
that were incorporated into it.
The aim of this paper is to delve into Rosgvardiya’s contribution to the 
military organisation and operational machinery of Russia, and to exam‑
ine its organisational and professional profile to see if it is more of 
a policing or military organisation. To answer those questions, the paper 
analyses the legal basis of Rosgvardiya’s functioning, its official docu‑
ments, reports and statements available on its website, as well as the 
media coverage of its operations.
The paper consists of three parts. Part I describes the legal and organ‑
isational base on which Rosgvardiya’s forces operate, and the changes 
thereto, which effectively apply to the entire security sector in Russia. 
Part II offers a review of the different security forces in the Russian Fed‑
eration, which are not usually taken into account when estimating the 
1 In  2011, the special forces headquarters were established. In May  2014 general 
Nikolai Rogozhkin, the long ‑serving commander of the Internal Troops (2004–2014) 














size of Russia’s internal security forces and their auxiliary structures. 
Part III attempts to offer an interpretation of the objectives of the reform, 
as well as Rosgvardiya’s place in the Russian Federation’s security and 
defence governance system. The organisation’s functions are discussed 














 • The National Guard of the Russian Federation, whose size is  officially 
estimated at 340,000 personnel, is currently the Russian Federation’s 
largest internal security structure and operates to the standards 
of a military organisation. For comparison, the Ministry for Civil 
Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natu‑
ral Disasters has 288,500 posts and the Federal Security Service has 
around 200,000. The new service has been assigned independent 
functions (intervening in the event of public order disturbance and 
providing security to Russia’s critical infrastructure), as well as tasks 
that involve assisting the other security departments (including par‑
ticipation in border protection, combatting terrorism and extremism, 
territorial defence). Rosgvardiya performs those functions through 
its territorially organised structure of regular troops that include 
intervention units, rapid response forces and units for combat‑
ting sabotage and illegal militant groups, and state security forces. 
Russia’s extensive security contractor sector, which Rosgvardiya 
oversees, is a natural extension of its own structure and serves as 
a reserve pool of personnel to form non ‑regular units (self ‑defence 
detachments, private companies, Cossack units).
 • Unlike the Internal Troops, which existed before 2014 and whose de‑
fence readiness was of secondary importance compared to their role 
as an internal security force, Rosgvardiya (which the Internal Troops 
have been incorporated into) is represented as one of the state’s mili‑
tary instruments. Its place in the military organisation of the Russian 
state is defined by its territorial defence tasks – in the specific Rus‑
sian meaning of territorial defence. Russia does not expect an armed 
attack on its own territory: territorial defence mainly means cover‑
ing the rear of, and providing auxiliary services to, the Armed Forces, 
and is delivered by the reserve forces as well as by search and rescue 
and security formations. Rosgvardiya’s tasks of providing security to 













and high ‑risk facilities such as nuclear power plants and gas and oil 
transmission infrastructure, therefore fits into the definition of ter‑
ritorial defence.
 • The changes that Rosgvardiya is has implemented (switching to 
a contracts ‑based system of recruitment, a military command sys‑
tem, the modernisation of equipment, intensification of drills, and 
a renewal of the formation’s image to rebuild its prestige as an ‘inter‑
nal guard’ through references to Russia’s historical experiences and 
Western models) are part of the general trend of the progressing 
militarisation of the society, the development and expansion of the 
state’s military organisation and the mobilisation of the public.
 • The principles of autonomy and self ‑sufficiency adopted by Ros‑
gvardiya have been conducive to the development of its capacity for 
rapid reaction and the flexible use of force. The spectrum of Ros‑
gvardiya’s operations includes counterterrorism, anti ‑sabotage oper‑
ations, the combatting of illegal militant groups and the countering 
of information threats, i.e. dealing with everything that meets the 
definition of hybrid threats.
 • The ongoing changes have been making Rosgvardiya more multi‑
‑functional while expanding the range of intervention measures it 
can deploy and tightening the system of internal oversight.
 • The credibility of the officially declared objectives of the creation 
of Rosgvardiya (putting the defence contractor business in order, 
lowering its costs) has been undermined by the four years of the 
formation’s actual functioning. There is no interest in reforming the 
commercialised state security sector, not in the Kremlin, and cer‑
tainly not in the Russian institutions of force. The security contract‑
ing business, which facilitates the consolidation of the institutions 
of force and covertly sponsors a personnel reserve for the official 













the state and private security and defence actors, and the distinc‑
tion between offensive and defensive potential. The ‘camouflage’ of 
security contractors serves to neutralise political risks (by conceal‑
ing engagement and casualties), while expanding Russia’s capacity 
to conduct special operations in peacetime and providing additional 
support to the Armed Forces during war.
 • The large sector of security contractors considerably expands Ros‑
gvardiya’s reach and capacity as an official state infrastructure (com‑
pared with the former Internal Troops), an internal service ensuring 
the stability of the authoritarian regime, and a formation implement‑













I. IN THE ARMY’S IMAGE
1. Rosgvardiya – a military or policing force?
Created in 2016, Rosgvardiya is a new Russian institution of force that 
is part of the public order and critical infrastructure security system, 
spun off from the structures of the Russian Interior Ministry. As an inde‑
pendent, stand ‑alone service, it was expected to become more efficient 
in delivering its original internal security tasks, while also strengthening 
its defence capacity as part of the Russian state’s military organisation.
The new service’s definition laid down in the bill “On the National Guard 
troops” adopted on 3 July 2016 emphasises its role in the Russian Feder‑
ation’s security system: “The National Guard is a military organisation 
created to ensure state and public security and to defend human and 
civil rights and liberties”. The catalogue of Rosgvardiya’s statutory tasks, 
defined in art. 2 of the same bill, includes:
1. Participating, jointly with the bodies of the internal affairs structures, 
in activities aimed at protecting order, ensuring public security and 
safeguarding state of emergency regimes;
2. Participating in combatting terrorism and safeguarding the legal 
regime of anti ‑terror operations;
3. Participating in combatting extremism;
4. Participating in the territorial defence of the Russian Federation;
5. Providing security to important state facilities and special cargoes 
prelisted in a catalogue approved by the government of the Russian 
Federation;
6. Supporting the border guard of the FSB in protecting the Russian 













7. Providing security to members of the governing bodies of the Rus‑
sian Federation’s subjects (as per a regulation by the President of the 
Russian Federation).
Apart from points 3 and 7 (the latter having been added by a 2018 amend‑
ment to the bill), Rosgvardiya’s tasks do not differ from the tasks of the 
former Internal Troops. They are spelt out in more detail in a presidential 
decree of 30 September 2016 approving the Statute of the FSVNG, which 
emphasises Rosgvardiya’s oversight functions “in the sphere of private 
security contractors, private detective services and non ‑government‑
‑provided security”. The catalogue of Rosgvardiya’s statutory tasks as 
defined in the decree’s annexe is wider, but equally general and includes:
1. Developing and implementing the state’s policies in its designated 
spheres of activity;
2. Drafting normative and legal regulations in the designated spheres 
of activity;
3. Organising the participation of the National Guard troops in the pro‑
tection of public order and ensuring public security;
4. Organising the participation of the National Guard troops in combat‑
ting terrorism and extremism and in safeguarding the legal regime of 
anti ‑terror operations;
5. Organising the participation of the National Guard troops in the ter‑
ritorial defence of the Russian Federation;
6. Maintaining the necessary level of readiness of the National Guard 
troops;
7. Organising the deployment of the National Guard troops in accord‑













8. Implementing measures to expand and develop the National Guard 
troops;
9. Implementing federal state oversight of:
 • weapons trade for civilian2 and professional use and weapons 
awarded as rewards, oversight over munitions and the technical 
condition of weapons for professional use temporarily in the pos‑
session of citizens and organisations;
 • the operations of private security contractors and detectives in the 
Russian Federation;
 • the security of the fuels and energy complex;
 • operations of units in charge of providing the security of legal 
persons with special statutory tasks, as well as units delivering 
government ‑provided security services;
10. Providing social and legal protection to military personnel, persons 
with police ranks who serve in the National Guard (collaborators), 
federal civilian state officials, persons discharged from services in 
the National Guard troops, their family members and other persons 
entitled to social protection provided by Rosgvardiya in accordance 
with the laws in force in the Russian Federation.
The statute puts Rosgvardiya on an equal footing with the other Russian 
intelligence services in the overall system of governance: Rosgvardiya is 
one of the presidential departments, i.e. a federal executive organ oper‑
ating under the president and headed by an official with the status of 
a federal minister. The statute also defines in detail the management pre‑
rogatives of Rosgvardiya’s leadership and its powers in the field of inter‑
vention and defence activities. The latter include: the planning of the 
use of the armed forces during war and in peacetime, participation in 
2 In accordance with the federal bill “On weapons” the legal definition of ‘weapons 














the development of military mobilisation plans, participation in infor‑
mation warfare, participation in civilian and territorial defence activities, 
building up and training a reserve, and field and anti ‑sabotage recon‑
naissance in operations theatres. The military character of the service 
is also reflected in the powers of its director, who is supposed to fully 
follow the disciplinary statute of the Armed Forces, closely co‑operate 
with the Defence Ministry, propose deployments and redeployments of 
Rosgvardiya’s troops in agreement with the Defence Minister and suggest 
their composition and structure, establish operational ‑territorial forma‑
tions, reorganise them and disband them.
This outline of Rosgvardiya’s tasks suggests that the service has a dual 
mission which includes both a policing and security role (protecting pub‑
lic order, security of critical infrastructure) and military tasks (involve‑
ment in countering non ‑military threats such as sabotage, terrorism, 
extremism, territorial defence). The dual nature of the service has been 
emphasised in statements by its official representatives who have repeat‑
edly stressed that the territorial structures and the combat potential of 
Rosgvardiya are an important element in the military organisation of the 
Russian Federation, while also defining its mission as ‘combat and service’.
A military organisation system for Rosgvardiya’s forces has been estab‑
lished by the “Bylaws of operational ‑territorial formations of the National 
Guard troops”3, enacted by Vladimir Putin’s decree No. 236 of 24 May 2017. 
An ‘operational ‑territorial formation’ or ‘district’ is defined in point 1 as 
a “military ‑administrative unit of the National Guard troops, created to 
accomplish assigned tasks”.
The tasks in question belong in the domains of both security and defence, 
as evidenced by point 7 of the decree. Subpoint 7(a), which some experts 
consider to be controversial4, provides that “by a decision of the President 
3 ‘Задачи и функции оперативно‑территориальных объединений войск нацио‑
нальной гвардии’, Росгвардия, www.rosgvard.ru.













of the Russian Federation, units and tactical unions of the Armed Forces 
and other military formations and bodies may be put under the opera‑
tional command of a National Guard district commander in order to per‑
form tasks assigned to the National Guard troops”. While observing the 
growing political stature of Rosgvardiya, however, the experts overlook 
the ‘symmetrical’ subpoint 7(b) which provides that “units and tactical 
unions of the National Guard troops may be put under the operational 
command of a military district commander of the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation in order to perform defence tasks”.
In reality what is emphasised here is the tactical autonomy of Ros‑
gvardiya troops: they perform their mission independently, but in special 
cases may receive assistance from the Russian Federation’s defence forces. 
The National Guard troops are also mobile and flexible to deploy. This 
follows from point 8 in the bylaws under which a district commander 
of Ros gvardiya troops may decide to put them under the command of 
another district.
The entire territory of the Russian Federation comprises eight military 
groupings in Rosgvardiya’s eight territorial districts:
 • Central (headquarters in Moscow),
 • Northwestern (St Petersburg),
 • North Caucasian (Pyatigorsk),
 • Southern (Rostov‑on‑Don),
 • Volga (Nizhny Novgorod),
 • Ural (Yekaterinburg),
 • Siberian (Novosibirsk),
 • Eastern (Khabarovsk).
The districts correspond to the federal districts of Russia and are directly 
subordinated to respective government apparatuses of the federal dis‑
tricts. Within the Rosgvardiya districts there are directorates (at the 













with the administrative divisions of the Russian Federation. The local 
presence of Rosgvardiya is strengthened by the territorial units of the 
non ‑government ‑provided security structures. At the level of oblasts and 
federation subjects, those are subordinated to the directorates, and at the 
lower levels – to Rosgvardiya units. The field structure of Rosgvardiya is 
complemented by the headquarters (see Chart 1)5.
The combat potential is under the command of the General Staff of the 
National Guard troops, to which the district staffs and the main com‑
munications headquarters are subordinated; the Dzerzhinsky Separate 
Special Purpose Division stationed in Balashikha (10,000 troops) is also 
directly under the command of the General Staff 6.
Observers estimate Rosgvardiya’s strength at around 500,000 personnel. 
According to director Viktor Zolotov, Rosgvardiya has 340,000 official 
posts, but this number is set to increase by a third by 2020. According to 
deputy director, General Sergei Lebedev, the security segment accounts 
for more than half of this number (160,000  service members in the 
policing formations and 53,000  staff of the Okhrona company). Dur‑
ing a briefing summarising the first year of Rosgvardiya’s functioning, 
Lebedev emphasised the formation’s policing functions in addition to its 
security role, saying that 1.7 million people have been detained for mis‑
demeanours, and 46,500 on criminal charges7.
5 A full structure of Rosgvardiya’s central apparatus has not been officially disclosed. 
It can be reconstructed on the basis of presidential decrees appointing the heads 
of individual directorates, as well as media reports. See e.g.: ‘Путин назначил 
руководство Росгвардии’, РИА Новости, 13 October 2017, www.ria.ru; ‘Разведка 
Росгвардии будет «вскрывать угрозы для государственного строя в России»’, 
Русский Монитор, 19 December 2016, www.rusmonitor.com, and other sources.
6 The division’s history dates back to 1921 when the first special purpose unit (OSNAZ) 
was created on the initiative of Felix Dzerzhinsky. In  1924 it became the core of 
a three ‑regiment division and was named after Dzerzhinsky after his death.
7 This statement should be interpreted in the context of the harsh criticism previ‑
ously levelled at the Interior Ministry, which was accused of letting crime increase 
even as the numbers of functionaries were increasing. See: ‘Состоялся брифинг 
заместителя директора Росгвардии генерал‑лейтенанта полиции Сергея Лебе‑
























Map. Rosgvardiya’s territorial districts
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Chart 1. Rosgvardiya’s central apparatus
Source: own preparation.
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2. More than technical changes
As previously mentioned, in addition to the regular Internal Troops, the 
militarised non ‑government ‑provided security units previously con‑
trolled by the Interior Ministry have also been incorporated into Ros‑
gvardiya, as have been the bodies in charge of overseeing and licencing 
security contractors and detectives in Russia, issuing private and profes‑
sional firearms permits and keeping firearms registers, and the private 
company Okhrona providing paid security services.
The special ‑purpose policing units (spetsnaz) distributed across the whole 
of Russia (including Rus, Rosich, Skif, Rys, Ural, Yermak, Nars, Kuzbas, 
Tarnik, Taifun, Bulat, Zhubr and others) originally differed in terms of 
training levels, the legal status of the functionaries/soldiers, and assigned 
tasks. Units in different regions had different uniforms and equipment 
(police forces have been partly funded from local budgets, which have 
been covering their equipment expenses). Moreover, the Interior Min‑
istry differentiated the military and policing spetsnaz. The policing ones 
specialised in pacifying demonstrations (160 units of the special police 
OMON) and combatting organised crime (82 special rapid reaction units, 
SOBR). The standalone Internal Troops reconnaissance units (ORO) and 
the OSNAZ special units for combatting illegal militant groups and pro‑
viding security to strategic state facilities and special convoys were of 
a military nature. They recruited troops through conscription and under 
contracts.
The changes implemented with the creation of Rosgvardiya have 
been in line with a wider tendency towards militarisation and the 
integration of the state’s military organisation and its potential. 
This has been without prejudice to the autonomous competences of 
Rosgvardiya, whose important assets include the ability to respond 
immediately and to use force flexibly, to independently conduct 
reconnaissance and carry out non ‑military operations. The range 













natural and other disasters, ensuring security at mass public events, 
dispersing opposition rallies, combatting organised crime groups, 
counterterrorism, anti ‑sabotage operations, combatting illegal mil‑
itant groups and countering information threats, i.e. dealing with 
everything that falls under the definition of hybrid threats.
According to the initial plans8 the forming of Rosgvardiya was expected 
to be completed by 1  January 2018. While there have been delays, the 
direction of change is clearly defined by:
1. Moving to a contracts ‑based recruitment system
The biggest perturbations in this regard concerned the planned 
transition of OMON and SOBR functionaries to contract service by 
1 January 2018. The difficulties (stemming from the fact that initially 
a standard procedure involving an examination by a military medi‑
cal commission was applied) were resolved due to a legislative inter‑
vention by the president. Under the presidential amendments to the 
bill “On the forces of the National Guard of the Russian Federation” 
approved by the Duma in late May 2019, guard members who hold 
police ranks may be moved to contract service without undergoing 
a repeat qualification procedure (medical examination, skills, qualifi‑
cations and fitness testing)9. They also keep their original social guar‑
antees and acquire new ones to which members of the military are 
eligible. Moreover, Rosgvardiya is going to admit persons over forty 
to contract service. Rosgvardiya reserve forces will also be trained in 
the contract service system.
8 ‘ТАСС: «Сергей Меликов: создание Росгвардии полностью завершится в янва‑
ре 2018 года»’, Росгвардия, www.rosgvard.ru.
9 ‘Путин подписал закон об упрощенном приеме на службу по контракту 













2. A military command system
Rosgvardiya troops are now under a single command and all operate 
on the same legal basis. The service members are trained in a military 
system. The original three levels of subordination (to the president, to 
the Interior Minister and to the military commander) have been sim‑
plified by eliminating the intermediate level in the chain of command.
At this point it is worth noting that the Russian system of command 
is characterised by a strong tradition of subordination to political 
power. Rosgvardiya’s director is the chief of the General Staff, but the 
president is the commander ‑in ‑chief and the supreme leader. Guard 
members serving in the spetsnaz will be bound by military regulations. 
Their legal status as military service members offers the commanders 
additional instruments: e.g. they may decide to move them into bar‑
racks. Moreover, the military regulations also ensure better financial 
conditions of service (a range of additional rebates and allowances, 
such as a holiday allowance), and better welfare and living conditions 
(participation in the military mortgage programme).
3. Dual equipment
Rosgvardiya servicemen will have two sets of equipment:  combat 
gear (similar to the equipment of infantry troops) and special equip‑
ment for riot police tasks (special vests, helmets with plastic visors, 
shields, rubber batons, tear gas canisters, gas grenades, water can‑
nons,  etc.)10. The personal Ratnik systems modified to meet Ros‑
gvardiya’s needs will enable the troops to adapt to current threats11. 
The personal equipment of guard members (including the parachute 
systems) is generally regarded as more modern than the equipment 
10 ‘Влaдислав Шурыгин, Это Росгвардия!’, Изборский клуб, 17 July 2017, www.iz‑ 
borsk‑club.ru.
11 Т.Д. Намсараев, ‘Перевооружение войск национальной гвардии’, Академиче­













of the former police spetsnaz units. For instance, observers have noted 
that Ros gvardiya forces routinely use state ‑of ‑the ‑art reconnaissance 
and monitoring systems including unmanned aerial vehicles. Such 
devices are held by the special purpose aviation units (AOSP) which 
are stationed separately but are part of Rosgvardiya’s territorial 
structures12.
4. Organisational changes: autonomy and self ‑sufficiency
Rosgvardiya’s special forces have undergone the most radical changes. 
They were already the main focus of the previous Interior Ministry 
reform. In 2011, regional special ‑force headquarters were established 
in Novosibirsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Kazan, Barnaul and Shchyolkovo 
near Moscow. There was also a Special Aviation Headquarters for 
Operational Response, a special headquarters for non ‑government‑
‑provided security under the Interior Ministry, and others.
Those forces have been consolidated within Rosgvardiya13. In early 
2017, the Main Directorate for the Special Forces was established. 
OMON, ORO, SOBR and other units were put under one command 
structure. Regional directorates for special forces, as well as for sup‑
plies and technical support bases, are going to be established under 
Rosgvardiya’s regional headquarters. The Rosgvardiya’s spetsnaz units 
have their own reconnaissance units and their own groups for com‑
batting drones. The aim of the changes has been to make them more 
effective and to develop their functionality and self ‑sufficiency. They 
are supposed to be quickly deployable in any region of the Russian 
Federation, depending on the needs.
12 ‘Генерал‑полковник Сергей Меликов в преддверии Дня авиации Росгвардии 
вручил награды отличившимся военнослужащим и сотрудникам’, Росгвар‑
дия, 22.03.2018, www.rosgvard.ru.
13 А. Лыков, И. Кордешов, ‘Слаживание территориальных органов ФСВНГ как 
элемент формирования войск’, Академический вестник войск национальной гвар­













A pilot regional special forces directorate of Rosgvardiya was estab‑
lished in the Moscow Oblast on the basis of the Dzerzhinsky Division. 
It has also incorporated SOBR units from Dolgoprudnoye, and OMON 
units from the towns of Shchyolkovo, Sergiyev Posad and Podolsk 
near Moscow. It is served by the 70th Special Aviation Regiment sta‑
tioned in Yermolino (Kaluga Oblast) and the special ‑purpose squad‑
ron stationed in Shchyolkovo in the Moscow Oblast. Another regional 
directorate for the Caucasus is set to be established in Pyatigorsk.
5. The principle of strict co‑operation with the other Russian  
institutions of force
The original subordination to the Interior Ministry has been replaced 
with a formula of strict co‑operation with the Interior Ministry in 
areas of shared competences. This was particularly emphasised in the 
early days of Rosgvardiya, when the formation experienced perturba‑
tions in connection with its provision of armed backup to the police. 
The legal documents and information materials available on the Ros‑
gvardiya’s website also emphasise close co‑operation with other gov‑
ernment departments (see Chart 2).
According to Gen. Yuri Babkin, who is in charge of Rosgvardiya’s train‑
ing department, the institution has signed bilateral agreements with 
the Ministry of Defence, the Interior Ministry, the FSB, the Foreign 
Intelligence Service (SVR) and the FSO on training and improving the 
qualifications of guard members14. The joint drills of the spetsnaz units 
of different ministries contribute to building closer co‑operation15. 
It is also believed that the unification involves the implementation 
14 ‘Росгвардия откроет свой факультет в Институте физкультуры Минобороны’, 
РБК, 18 October 2018, www.rbc.ru.
15 In addition to the Rosgvardiya spetsnaz units there are the Alfa and Vympel forces 
of the FSB, the Zaslon of the SVR, the spetsnaz units of the Main Directorate of the 
Armed Forces General Staff, better known as the GRU, the so‑called black berets 
of the FSO, i.e.  a  commando unit specialising in anti ‑terror operations, and the 













of solutions developed by the Special Operations Forces of Russia, 
which supposedly corroborates the claims that there is a comprehen‑
sive plan for the development of a special forces organisation which 
spans all the militarised government departments in Russia16.
Chart 2. Rosgvardiya’s co‑operation with selected Russian security 
institutions
Source: own preparation.
6. Intensification of drills
Following the example of the Armed Forces, Rosgvardiya units are 
training more intensively. They hold joint drills with troops from the 
Forces of the Defence Ministry, they are regarded as the elite units of the Russian 
Federation’s military organisation.
16 Many observers believe that Rosgvardiya, like the Army in the case Special Opera‑
tions Forces, has been copying solutions developed by the FSB. Special attention has 
been paid to the Alfa and Vympel spetsnaz which are part of the Special Purpose 
Headquarters / Anti ‑Terror Headquarters of the FSB, which is part of the Service 
for the Protection of the Constitutional Order and Combatting Terrorism (2nd Ser‑
vice of the FSB). The headquarters was founded in 1998 at the initiative of the then 
head of the Federal Security Service, Vladimir Putin. See: А. Степанов, ‘Коммандос 
и не снилось. Спецназ ФСБ назван одним из лучших в мире’, Российская газета, 
no. 80 (7838), 10 April 2019.
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other institutions of force, as well as separate exercises. The drills fol‑
low different scenarios: supporting the Armed Forces in urban combat 
and the suppression of protests, anti ‑sabotage operations, releasing 
hostages, anti ‑terror operations and humanitarian operations.
The main theme of the first drill of two Rosgvardiya brigades and the 
Special Forces Headquarters (4,000 troops in total) concerned coun‑
tering terrorism, extremism and sabotage, including illegal groups 
aiming to stoke riots or an armed attack against the Russian Feder‑
ation’s constitutional order. It was conducted in the summer of 2016 
in the Volgograd Oblast17 alongside the commandos of the 56th Air‑
borne Division whose role in the drill scenario was to block some Ros‑
gvardiya units. The drill was commanded by Gen. Andrei Kholzakov, 
deputy commander of the Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation.
Then Rosgvardiya took part in the Zapad 2017 drill with the search 
and rescue units of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the 
FSB Special Forces Headquarters. When this was completed, its 
spetsnaz units held a drill focused on landings and the provision of 
logistics and backend support together with Belarusian units. Ros‑
gvardiya troops were mentioned alongside the FSB, Interior Minis‑
try and Ministry of Emergency Situations in press reports about the 
Vostok 2018 drill involving Chinese and Mongolian troops, in which 
nearly 300,000 soldiers practised simultaneously in 13 land ranges, 
4 air ranges and 4 maritime ranges.
Rosgvardiya itself emphasises that its troops train in difficult ter‑
rain. The Russian ‑Chinese spetsnaz drill codenamed Cooperation 2017, 
which took place in China, involved the Russian Vityaz and Rys 
spetsnaz units performed marching and climbing exercises in desert 
and mountainous terrain with the Chinese Desert Foxes force. In 2018 














in the Arctic, Vityaz, Rys, guard members from the Northwestern 
District and the Chechen Terek spetsnaz exercised the pursuit and 
liquidation of a sabotage group under difficult climate conditions18. 
In 2018 Rosgvardiya also took part in the North 2018 exercise with the 
Interior Ministry, the FSB, the FSO and the Ministry of Emergency 
Situations.
The drills show that one of the main objectives of the reform has 
been to harmonise the level of training between different units, to 
consolidate them and improve their interoperability with the other 
Russian institutions of force.
7. A shift in information policy: long memory and Western models
Unlike the Federal Security Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service 
or the GRU, which have recently celebrated their centenaries, Ros‑
gvardiya emphasises its imperial lineage and traditions dating back 
to more than two centuries ago. It claims its history begins in 1811 
when, on the eve of the Napoleonic Wars campaign, Tsar Alexan‑
der I established the Internal Guard. Government historians empha‑
sise the guard’s dual allegiance: to the tsar as a security force, and to 
the minister of war, as an element of the state’s military organisation. 
As the guardian of the long memory of the intelligence services, Ros‑
gvardiya also considers the experiences of the Soviet‑era Cheka –GPU–
OGPU–NKVD to be part of its heritage.
In addition to its Russian traditions, Rosgvardiya’s experts point to 
Western models such as the US National Guard or the Italian Cara‑
binieri and – most frequently, the French Gendarmerie and National 
Guard. The latter evokes the tradition of La Marseillaise and the ‘peo‑
ple in arms’. The militarisation in Russia (military organisation of the 
18 It was, simultaneously, an evident political demonstration, as the media had several 













state and society) is intended to mobilise the people in defence of the 
besieged fortress (this refers to an artificially created threat).
3. Rosgvardiya’s place in Russia’s new military  
organisation model
Yuri Baluyevsky, former Chief of General Staff and currently advisor to 
Rosgvardiya’s chief, Viktor Zolotov, openly states that President Putin’s 
decree of 5 April 2016 establishing the force was a logical consequence 
of the “Defence Plan of the Russian Federation 2016–2020” approved 
in November 2015. The formation of a new structure of crucial impor‑
tance for the territorial defence of Russia is, in his opinion, “an answer 
to the challenges which Russian society has to confront, including the 
threat of non ‑violent resistance techniques or, more precisely, a colour 
revolution”19.
Colonel Igor Kardash also believes Rosgvardiya to be the foundation 
of the state ‑of ‑the ‑art, effective territorial defence system that Russia 
is currently building. Kardash, who heads the Rosgvardiya Centre for 
Strategic Research, studies the analytic rationale for the deployment 
of its forces20. Like General Baluyevsky, he believes that it is defined by 
the nature of contemporary threats. He notes that non ‑military threats 
(terrorism, radical social groups spreading extremist ideologies, foreign 
non ‑governmental organisations, and citizens who act against the ter‑
ritorial integrity of Russia and destabilise the country) have long been 
recognised as potential threats to the security of the Russian Federation, 
which has been reflected in the Russian military doctrines and national 
security strategies. The threats identified in those documents perfectly 
19 Ю.  Балуевский, ‘Война не кончается, она  – замирает’, Независимая газета, 
26 May 2017, nvo.ng.ru.
20 К.И. Леонидович, ‘Развитие нормативно‑правовой базы территориальной обо‑
роны Российской Федерации в современных условиях’, Военноe право России, 
5 March 2018, www.millaw.ru; Idem, ‘Hормативные основы войск национальной 
гвардии Российской Федерации в территориальной обороне и контртеррори‑













match the catalogue of Rosgvardiya’s tasks in his opinion, defining its 
role and place in the new military organisation of the Russian state.
In this way, Rosgvardiya analysts are clearly shifting the focus of the pub‑
lic debate about the organisation. It is generally believed that the main 
reason it was established was the government’s concerns about uncon‑
trollable internal developments (in the social, political and economic 
sphere). As an extraordinary instrument created to respond to a system 
crisis, Rosgvardiya was seen as expanding the range of methods, forces 
and means of the apparatus of repression. External threats (i.e. mainly 
the so‑called colour revolutions and foreign sabotage) were a mere pre‑
text for the use of force against the Kremlin’s opponents. This line of 
thinking stems from the old but still entrenched view of internal threats 
and of the Internal Troops, which have been associated predominantly 
with combatting anti ‑Kremlin opposition and using force against protest 
movements.
Colonel Kardash and other officers from the Rosgvardiya Centre for Stra‑
tegic Research21 are correcting such perceptions in the public debate, 
emphasising the contemporary dominance of non ‑regular forms of 
warfare, i.e. operations below the threshold of conventional war, and 
the open and covert involvement of (state and non ‑state) paramilitary 
formations. They emphasise Rosgvardiya’s assets such as its ‘territorial‑
ity’ (i.e. its presence in every region of the Russian Federation) and its 
capacity to perform different tasks (combat ‑service, operational, special). 
Rosgvardiya is also supposed to be an instrument that deters the enemy 
from undertaking active steps against Russia, such as provocation, sab‑
otage or terrorism. In other words, it is an instrument of effective terri‑
torial defence. In the view of the analysts of the Rosgvardiya Centre for 
Strategic Research, this efficacy is possible thanks to the contemporary 
21 See e.g. the online Академический вестник войск национальной гвардии Российской 
Федерации, an expert supplement to the Rosgvardiya journal На боевом посту. Both 














legal basis of territorial defence, which enables the build ‑up of forces 
and means, and the constant training and upskilling of reserves, estab‑
lishes a new system of governance for territorial defence and defines 
the powers and responsibilities of the different actors involved in terri‑
torial defence.
In the past, the activities of the Internal Troops were kept secret. Cur‑
rently, the public is constantly fed information about Rosgvardiya’s 
involvement in territorial defence and its potential and capabilities – as 
demonstrated e.g. by the publications of official figures on Rosgvardiya. 
The introduction of internal security topics into public debate should 
be interpreted as a  symptom of the change in the Kremlin’s attitude 
towards information policy. The new approach is best summed up in 
the statement of the Defence Minister Sergei Shoygu who commented 
in April 2019 on the plans to create regional centres for the coordination 
of efforts by the different institutions of force in crisis situations. A pilot 
agreement on the subject was signed by the Russian Defence Ministry 
with the Tula Oblast’s governor general, Alexei Dyumin22. The agreement 
provides that the centre will monitor the region’s economic and social 
situation, crisis situations, and infrastructural problems (especially in 
the field of transport). The information gathered, as well as signals about 
any changes in the military ‑political situation in the region, will be trans‑
ferred to the local executive. According to Minister Shoygu23, the imple‑
mentation of the agreement marks “a huge step towards the development 
of a  state and defence governance system”. He continues, “In a crisis 
situation, the regional authorities will be able to directly  co‑operate, 
vertically and horizontally, with the Defence Ministry, the Ministry for 
22 Appointed as the governor of Tula Oblast in 2016, Gen. Alexei Dyumin started his 
professional career in the Federal Protective Service. He served for many years as 
the deputy head of the Presidential Protection Service and in 2015 was nominated 
as the Chief of General Staff of the Land Forces. As revealed in the TV RTR Planeta 
documentary “Crimea. The way home”, in 2014 Dyumin took part in the annexation 
of Crimea and evacuated the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych.
23 ‘Шойгу пообещал создать во всех регионах кризисные центры управления’, 













Emergency Situations and Civil Defence, and the government depart‑
ments in charge of defending the legal order. In peaceful times and in 
peacetime, the Defence Ministry will obtain in return information about 
the social situation of military personnel and their families, the number 
of places available in kindergartens and schools, on the implementation 
of the conscription plans, etc.”
According to Colonel Viktor Murakhovsky, the editor of the “Arsenal Ote‑
chestva” journal, establishing such centres is necessary in view of the 
new duties of the local governments (governments of the subjects of 
the Russian Federation), who are now responsible for organising terri‑
torial defence24.
In a clear example of the new dynamics in the field of territorial defence, 
the bill “On the defence of the Russian Federation” amended in 2014 laid 
down a legal definition of territorial defence25. The definition empha‑
sises three elements: 1) the security of important state facilities, 2) com‑
batting illegal armed groups, enemy landings and sabotage, and 3) the 
prevention of such threats. The related duties were signalled at that time 
in the classified “Bylaws of the Territorial Defence of the Russian Federa‑
tion”. In 2017, Article 22 of the bill was expanded by adding points 4–10, 
which concern the organisation of inter ‑ministerial coordination offices. 
Under the new rules, these offices would be led by the heads of the 
24 ‘В регионах появятся антикризисные центры Минобороны’, Век, 10 April 2019, 
www.wek.ru.
25 The definition is contained in Art. 22 of the bill: “Territorial defence is a system of 
undertakings performed under martial law in the domains of the security and pro‑
tection of military facilities, important state facilities and special facilities enabling 
people’s life activities, the functioning of transport, communication infrastructures 
and energy facilities, facilities posing increased risks to human life and health and 
the natural environment, as well as undertakings involving the combatting of sabo‑
tage and intelligence formations of foreign states and illegal armed groups, the 
detection, prevention, interruption, mitigation and/or elimination of the effects of 
their activities in order to create good conditions for the functioning of the facilities 
named above and for the use of force by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federa‑














Russian Federation subjects (republic president, oblast governors, city 
mayors, etc.), who will be personally responsible for the performance 
of duties under the territorial defence legislation and the condition of 
forces and means created for this purpose26.
It should be noted here that Russia does not have an exact equivalent of 
territorial defence in the Western sense. Russian territorial defence is 
defined as a system of measures conducted under martial law. Russia does 
not expect an armed attack on its territory. Territorial defence stands for 
the service of security and search and rescue formations and the reserve, 
who are tasked with covering the rear of, and providing wider support to, 
the Armed Forces. At the same time, the territorial defence structure is 
a factor that binds together the entire state apparatus.  Scattered across 
the whole of Russia, Rosgvardiya is treated as one of the instru‑
ments to integrate the state’s territory. The security and defence 
apparatus thus partly replaces and controls the official state appa‑
ratus, permeates all levels of life and becomes the country’s infra‑
structure. This is how Minister Shoygu’s statement on the ‘huge step’ in 
the governance of the state and defence should be interpreted.
The specific Russian concept of territorial defence encompasses the 
security of the critical state infrastructure (and especially communica‑
tion infrastructure) provided by Rosgvardiya, as well as the security of 
26 Because the federal government has exclusive prerogatives with regards to security 
and defence and the oversight of the implementation of legislation in those fields, 
in practice the role of local government structures is limited to performing tasks 
assigned by the federal authorities. For this reason, the Russian legislation focuses 
mainly on defining the duties of the local government structures. They are required, 
inter alia, to ensure uninterrupted energy supplies for the Armed Forces, to pro‑
vide services to the Armed Forces, other troops and special forces, to perform civil 
defence and territorial defence tasks, and prepare mobilisations, which includes 
drafting plans to relocated plants and production facilities involved in manufac‑
turing arms. In practice, the list of the local government’s tasks has been growing. 
Also, it cannot be ruled out that Rosgvardiya has some informal (non ‑statutory) con‑
trol functions in this respect. Its extensive field structure and formal and informal 
capabilities (in 2018 Rosgvardiya was assigned a new tasks of providing physical 
security to local authority members) enable it to enforce local tasks at all levels of 













high ‑risk facilities such as nuclear power plants and the facilities of the 
fuels and energy sector. It also encompasses state oversight, performed 
by Rosgvardiya, of the business of security contractors and civilian 
firearms. According to Rosgvardiya’s own figures, some seven million 
different firearms are privately held in Russia. Federal oversight of this 
arsenal involves licencing gun ‑owners, controlling compliance with the 
relevant rules, and keeping databases of firearms and of the personnel 
of private security contractors and some state bodies delivering so‑called 
government ‑provided security.
Its powers to oversee firearms and security contractors enable Ros‑
gvardiya not only to oversee the lucrative market of commercial secu‑
rity services, but also to rely on the support of private and para ‑state 
forces and – where necessary – to create and assign tasks to such forces. 
In this sense, the so‑called Kadyrov’s Army and the Cossack troops are 
an extension of Rosgvardiya.
The establishment of Rosgvardiya and the new duties of local gov‑
ernments in Russia may be seen as the Russian way of dealing with 
the territorial defence issue. In keeping with the Russian strategic 
culture, the military organisation of society, which the concept calls 
for, does not foresee any space for bottom‑up initiatives. It is man‑
aged top ‑down and strictly controlled by the institutions of force.
The involvement of Rosgvardiya in territorial defence, which spec‑
tacularly introduced the service into public debate, should not 
obscure the fact that, from the Kremlin’s point of view, Rosgvardiya 
has to be useful ‘here and now’, i.e. during war and in peacetime, 
in the provinces and in the centre where, incidentally, the best‑
‑trained units have been concentrated. It is a multi ‑functional and 
multi ‑task service which, in addition to its statutory tasks, may 
perform non ‑statutory tasks and provide cover and camouflage for 













II. HIDDEN POTENTIAL UNDER ROSGVARDIYA’S 
SPECIAL SUPERVISION
1. The crowded sector of security contractors:  
general characteristics
Under the bill “On the National Guard troops” Rosgvardiya is a state exec‑
utive organ in charge of all matters related to the implementation of the 
state policy in the field of security contracting. Rosgvardiya oversees 
companies that offer security services as well as the resources needed for 
this kind of businesses (i.e. firearms and means of coercion) and issues 
licences to use them. This dimension of its activities has been empha‑
sised by President Putin27 who explained that one of the official objec‑
tives of the establishment of Rosgvardiya had been to put the security 
contracting business in order and to generate savings for the budget by 
lowering the costs of the security services in Russia.
The reform involves a certain paradox, as Rosgvardiya itself is also Rus‑
sia’s largest provider of commercial security services. It holds a monopoly 
position in this market because its services are available everywhere in 
Russia and it has effectively no competitors when it comes to protecting 
facilities that are important for state security. It provides a wide range of 
services free of charge (protecting strategic facilities from a list compiled 
by the Presidential Administration and the so‑called ‘important federal 
facilities under FSVNG protection’), while also providing paid security 
services under civil contracts. It has concluded such contracts with the 
central executive bodies, local authorities (subjects of the Russian Fed‑
eration), state ‑owned companies and corporations, and individual entre‑
preneurs and private persons.
Unlike the decision to subordinate the Interior Ministry’s Internal 
Troops and the special police forces to Rosgvardiya, putting it in charge 














of inspecting the security contracts sector has raised some doubts among 
observers. Since Soviet times, overseeing this business has been the role 
of the Interior Ministry, part of whose apparatus was dedicated to the 
protection of industrial plants, kolkhozes, ministries, etc. The Interior 
Ministry shared the responsibility for government ‑provided state 
security with the KGB (which protected important state institutions 
and strategic facilities) and institutions authorised to establish milita‑
rised security units (Russian: ведомственная военизированная охрана). 
The state system of government ‑provided security was shaken in 1989 
when the Soviet Interior Ministry began to commercialise it by allowing 
police stations to provide paid services to entities outside the govern‑
ment (so‑called non ‑government ‑provided security). The Russian 
Interior Ministry’s dominant position in the security services market 
was strengthened in 1992 by the bill “On private detective and security 
services in the Russian Federation”, which granted the ministry the 
authority to issue licences and oversee the sector. In 1999, the bill “On 
government ‑provided security” entered into force. This expanded the 
notion of government ‑provided security to include privatised facilities 
and strategic enterprises, and extended the right to such protection to 
institutions which are not federal executive organs (such as Gazprom). 
As in the case of private security contractors, the Interior Ministry was 
put in charge of licencing and supervising the government ‑provided 
security structures, although additional oversight was also performed 
by the president and the federal government.
Because of the growing demand for security services induced by the 
privatisation process, the security contracts sector in Russia has grown 
very large and today comprises many state and private actors, both legal 
and illegal. Today there is no longer talk of security services provided 
by military garrisons, but there are many indications that functionaries 
of the state security services continue to offer illegal protection and the 
execution of liabilities (the infamous institution of krysha)28. While there 
28 See: F. Varese, Mafia rosyjska. Prywatna ochrona w nowej gospodarce rynkowej, War‑













are many articles on the Russian security services business, the picture 
of the situation is still far from clear. That is because the media reports 
often concern private contractors, while President Putin’s call to put the 
sector in order mainly concerned the state segment, i.e.  government‑
‑provided and non ‑government ‑provided security.
Both terms, like the notion of state security, cause some interpretive dif‑
ficulty today. State security is often identified with the Federal Protec‑
tive Service (FSO) whose tasks are defined in the relevant bill29. The FSO 
specialises in the physical protection of the top state officials (president, 
prime minister, speakers of both chambers of parliament) and pro‑
tecting their seats and backup seats for use during wartime. However, 
the construction of new buildings, upgrades of existing ones and their 
maintenance is the responsibility of the presidential Special Facilities 
Service subordinated to the presidential Main Directorate for Special 
Programmes. In reality, many other segments of the state apparatus 
are involved in state protection, including the Interior Ministry which 
has transferred its security forces to Rosgvardiya but keeps some units 
that provide security to the ministry itself and to diplomatic missions. 
Government ‑provided security services are performed by all the insti‑
tutions in the security sector of Russia. The Ministry of Defence has its 
own forces for the protection of military units and some critical infra‑
structure facilities such as ammunition depots or research institutions 
working for the arms industry and located in the so‑called closed cities 
and territories (ZATO).
As a result of this multiplicity of actors, there is no coherence between 
the different elements of the system, and responsibilities are scattered. 
For instance, ZATO today are protected by Rosgvardiya and the Ministry 
problem, names the Russian mafia as an independent provider of security services 
among the other Russian security institutions. Illegal forms of protection by organ‑
ised crime actors are outside the scope of this analysis.
29 Федеральный закон «О государственной охране» от 27.05.1996 N 57‑ФЗ (послед‑













of Defence. Furthermore, the Atom–Okhrana company is in charge of 
the security of closed cities where the state ‑owned corporation Rosatom 
produces plutonium, uranium and their isotopes for military purposes 
and nuclear fuel and equipment for nuclear power plants, and researches 
civilian applications of nuclear technologies.
It is difficult to distinguish the competences of the different actors and 
critically analyse their practical operation because the legal basis is also 
dispersed. Security services are governed, among other acts, by the 
federal bill “On private security and detective services in the Russian 
Federation” of 11 March 1992, the bill “On state security” of 27 May 1996, 
“On government ‑provided security” of 14 April  1999, “On weapons” of 
13 December 1996, and the previously mentioned competence bill “On the 
National Guard troops” of 3 July 2016. The services are also regulated by 
a set of sectoral competence bills governing the functioning of individual 
corporations, such as the bill “On the state corporation Rostekhnologii” 
which established the RT‑Okhrana company, or the bill “On the Central 
Bank” which regulates the operations of the Rosinkas company30. Regu‑
lations applicable to the sector are also laid down in presidential decrees 
concerning strategic enterprises, joint stock companies and state ‑owned 
corporations, whose lists are constantly updated (in 2017 Rosgvardiya’s 
Okhrana company was also put on the list). Government ‑provided secu‑
rity is the object of constant regulatory efforts by the government, which 
approves the statutes and bylaws of individual entities and the lists of 
facilities they protect.
30 All the legal documents mentioned in the text are available from the Консуль‑
тантПлюс database (www.consultant.ru). See: Закон РФ «О частной детек‑
тивной и  охранной деятельности в  Российской Федерации» от  11.03.1992 
N  2487‑1 (последняя редакция); Федеральный закон «О государственной 
охране» от  27.05.1996 N  57‑ФЗ (последняя редакция); Федеральный закон 
«О ведомственной охране» от 14.04.1999 N 77‑ФЗ (последняя редакция); Феде‑
ральный закон от 03.07.2016 N 226‑ФЗ (ред. от 02.12.2019) «О войсках нацио‑
нальной гвардии Российской Федерации»; Федеральный закон «Об оружии» 













Understandably, many of those measures are subject to state secrecy pro‑
visions. For this reason, it is not possible to fully estimate the number of 
security agents in Russia; the data that is available is fragmentary and 
covers individual segments only. Based on this data, which comes from 
official and unofficial communications, it is possible to conclude that 
a quasi ‑army of government ‑provided security operatives exists, which 
is not included in the estimates of Russia’s (para)military potential. 
In 2010 police general Leonid Vedenov, who oversaw security contrac‑
tors at the Interior Ministry, estimated the size of this group at around 
350,000 persons, i.e. 36% of the Russian security services market31. In this 
context, introducing ‘order’ to the state security sector may also mean 
integrating Russia’s dispersed system of critical infrastructure security.
Finally, it also worth noting that Rosgvardiya is one of the 21  institu‑
tions that draft legal regulations as part of their official oversight tasks. 
As a result, the Russian security market is on the one hand overregu‑
lated32, and on the other governed by informal standards and legal norms. 
This is the case of the private military companies, which fall under the 
security services legislation (i.e. are formally supervised by Rosgvardiya), 
but because of their functions, are controlled by the Defence Ministry 
and the FSB which provides counter ‑intelligence protection for them.
31 See: ‘Выступление Леонида Веденова 18 ноября 2010 года’ on the Yaguar security 
firm’s website. In the same year, experts of the European University in St Peters‑
burg estimated the number of non ‑government ‑provided security functionaries 
within the Interior Ministry alone at 210,000, corresponding to 19.1% of all per‑
sons employed at the ministry, see: Реформирование управления вневедомствен­
ной охраны в контексте развития рынка охранных услуг, Петербург 2010.
32 The Russian government found those regulations to impede small and medium‑
‑sized business. Among other issues, it called into question Rosgvardiya’s require‑
ments concerning privately held weapons and the protection of the facilities of the 
fuels and energy complex, and announced a  review of the legislation and a  ‘reg‑
ulatory guillotine’ that would halve the oversight requirements (see: ‘Названы 
попадающие под «регуляторную гильотину» ведомства’, Lenta.Ru, 8 July 2019). 
Previously it was reported that Rosgvardiya (along with 11  other government 
departments) had applied to be deleted from the list of audit institutions whose 
prerogatives would be reduced (Aнна Холявко, Ольга Адамчук, ‘Часть ведомств 














The current legal situation is defined by: the absence of a framework law 
that would lay down legal definitions of the basic terms; chaotic regula‑
tions governing the procedures and rules for the establishment of security 
organisations in Russia; the vagueness of legislation; and, most impor‑
tantly, by the absence of a clear distinction between government ‑provided 
security (free of charge state security services) and non ‑government‑
‑provided security (paid, commercial security services). This situation, 
and especially the sector’s practical realities, have led Russian lawyers 
to conclude that putting the sector in order will be a major challenge33. 
So much is clear in view of the practice of Ros gvardiya’s operations and 
the definitional confusion it has created – as Rosgvardiya consistently 
refers to its own activities as non ‑government ‑provided security and 
clearly avoids using the notion of ‘state security’. This approach has 
also been reflected in the “Concept paper on the development of non‑
‑government ‑provided security for the years 2018–2021 and to 2025”34.
2. Rosgvardiya’s monopoly position  
in the Russian security sector
Because of its potential and competences, Rosgvardiya is a dominant 
actor in the Russian market for security services.
Chart 3. The non ‑government ‑provided security system of Rosgvardiya
Source: Rosgvardiya’s website (www.rosgvard.ru).
33 See for example: В.Б. Квасов, О.В. Шкеля, ‘Проблемы правового регулирования 
госудаpственной охраны объектов’, Общество и право, no. 1(63) 2018.
34 Концепция развития вневедомственной охраны на период 2018–2021 годов и далее 
до 2025 года, Росгвардия, www.rosgvard.ru.
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Rosgvardiya estimates the size of its in ‑house structures dealing with 
non ‑government ‑provided security35 at 124,000 persons (80,081 licenced 
security operatives and 43,824  technical staff including janitors and 
on‑duty security systems operators).
Those structures also include units specialising in the protection of im‑
portant state facilities and special cargoes. Before Rosgvardiya was es‑
tablished, those functions were traditionally performed by the special 
rapid ‑response units (SOBR) and special purpose units (OSNAZ), i.e. the 
basic units of militarised government ‑provided security. The units are 
24,458‑strong according to Rosgvardiya.
The last element in Rosgvardiya’s business segment is the Federal Uni‑
tary State ‑Owned Enterprise Okhrana, which provides services to state, 
corporate and private clients, including protection services for public 
buildings and buildings that are part of the state’s critical infrastructure. 
Chart below shows the offer of this company.
Chart 4. Services provided by the Federal Unitary State ‑Owned 
Enterprise Okhrana
Source: own preparation.
35 Here and below, the figures are quoted after the Концепция развития вневедом­






























Okhrana’s competitive advantage, according to its own advertisements, 
stems from: its accessibility (80 branches in different subjects of the Rus‑
sian Federation); its personnel with experience of service in the Interior 
Ministry, the FSB and the Defence Ministry; specialised units for milita‑
rised protection and special forces. Okhrana’s employees use the special 
means and weapons with which Rosgvardiya troops are equipped.
According to most observers, what makes Rosgvardiya’s offer unbeatable 
is the oversight it performs over the sector by licencing security compa‑
nies and issuing weapons permits. It supervises its private competitors 
in this way, as well as some competitors in the state sector.
According to Rosgvardiya’s figures, the company has a staff of 53,065, of 
which 39,425 are licenced security operatives; it also uses the services 
of 24,458 guard members from the militarised units for non ‑government‑
‑provided security. However, it should be noted that the figures change 
frequently: in January 2017 the government ‑provided structures of the 
Ministry (18,000 personnel) were incorporated into Okhrana, and in 
October 2018 the same happened with the Svyaz ‑Bezopasnost company 
of the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass 
Media (15,600 personnel).
According to Gen. Viktor Zolotov, the range of Rosgvardiya’s services is 
being constantly expanded36. Its troops are currently strengthening the 
protection in the Arctic zone, in the ports of the Northern Sea Route 
served by the atomic icebreakers, protecting the floating nuclear power 
plant in Chukotka, the coastal facilities of the energy bridge connect‑
ing Krasnodar Krai and Crimea, as well as the sanatoriums and resorts 
in Crimea (including Artek). The latter has necessitated the creation of 
maritime Rosgvardiya units in the Northern and Southern districts.
36 ‘Генерал армии Виктор Золотов провел расширенное заседание итоговой кол‑













Because of the opaqueness of the system of non ‑government ‑provided 
security and the non ‑transparent financing of this category of services 
(which may be paid for from the federal budget, local budgets, and cor‑
porate and private funds) only people with direct access are able to 
tell which Rosgvardiya services are free and which have to be paid for. 
The security business is not the only revenue source for Rosgvardiya, 
as it also earns considerable amounts of money from its supervision of 
the security services sector. A category six security operative licence 
(which authorises the use of firearms) costs around RUB  2,000, but 
before obtaining it, candidates also have to undergo mandatory train‑
ing that costs RUB 9,000, as well as dactyloscopy tests costing RUB 2,000, 
obtaining several medical certificates (from a drugs specialists, psychia‑
trist and general practitioner), and covering the administrative cost of 
applying for a certificate attesting a clean criminal record. The total cost 
is more than RUB 20,000, i.e. more than US$ 300.
According to official reports, Rosgvardiya’s security business does not gen‑
erate major profits. The proceeds from security services are deposited in 
the accounts of the territorial directorates and transferred to the central 
budget after covering taxes and all other costs. In 2018, they contributed 
RUB 14 billion to the central budget. For comparison, RUB 223.3 billion 
was earmarked for Rosgvardiya operations in the central budget37.
3. Rosgvardiya’s competitors?
As previously mentioned, a number of federal executive authorities (min‑
istries, government agencies) have their own structures that deliver state, 
government ‑provided security. Data on the size of the security forces of 
some government departments, such as the Ministry of Defence and the 
Ministry of Emergencies, is not public. Some ministries (e.g. the Ministry 
37 ‘«Независимое военное обозрение»: «Росгвардия увеличится на треть». Вик‑














of Culture) have the right to establish their own security structures but 
they have not done so and use the paid services of Rosgvardiya’s Okhrana 
company. The energy companies have been put in a privileged position 
by, among others, Article 9 of the bill “On the security of the facilities of 
the fuels and energy complex” which directly provides that those compa‑
nies have the right to create structures to deliver government ‑provided 
security38, as well as the 2008 amendment of the bill “On weapons” which 
gave the foreign security structures of Transneft, Rosneft and Gazprom 
the right to use weapons to ensure the security of the companies’ facil‑
ities abroad. The compiled numbers of government ‑provided security 
employees in individual entities are presented in Chart 5.
Chart 5. Number of staff working on government ‑provided security
Source: Rosgvardiya’s website (www.rosgvard.ru).
The security structures established by the different entities listed above 
differ in term of their organisation and legal status. In part, this is the 
effect of previous attempts to make the sector more ‘orderly’, and in part 
is a consequence of their relations with the Kremlin. The government‑
38 The 2016 amendment to the bill “On the security of the facilities of the fuels and 
energy complex” (see: Федеральный закон «О безопасности объектов топливно‑
‑энергетического комплекса» от  21.07.2011 N  256‑ФЗ) expanded this list to 
include Transnefteprodukt and the Unified Gas Supply System of Russia. Under 
the amended rules, energy infrastructure facilities may be protected, depending 
on their category, by state units dealing with non ‑government ‑provided security.



























‑provided security organisations include structures within ministries 
(Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Emergencies, Ministry of Transport); 
federal state ‑owned companies including unitary companies that are 
not subject to privatisation (Atom ‑Okhrana, Science and Technology 
Centre of the Federal Space Agency); legal persons including those with 
special status (security companies established by the so‑called Cossack 
troops); joint stock companies, including closed ones as in the case of 
Rostec (ZAO RT‑Okhrana). Special ‑status companies also have the status 
of strategic enterprises.
After Rosgvardiya was established and assigned the task of protecting 
important state facilities, the legal status of some of those structures 
changed. Rosgvardiya’s prerogative was laid down in its statute, but no 
criteria have been set to identify which facilities are ‘important’, and 
the selection is apparently carried out arbitrarily. This is reflected in 
the previously mentioned “Concept paper on the development of non‑
‑government ‑provided security for the years 2018–2021 and to  2025” 
which identifies a wide category of ‘legal persons with special statutory 
tasks’. The category comprises diverse actors, some of whom (Gazprom, 
Rosneft, Russian Railways, Alrosa, Transneft) benefit from dual pro‑
tection provided by their own in‑house structures and by Rosgvardiya 
(apparently acting in its capacity as the provider of security to important 
facilities). The in‑house security structures of the above actors have the 
status of ‘affiliates’. The private security organisations established by the 
Cossack associations (so‑called troops) have a similar status. The remain‑
ing ones are so‑called other legal persons whose statutory tasks include 
tasks that involve using firearms, and who engage in sectoral security 
services, including the Central Bank of Russia, Sberbank, the Federal 
Office of the Special Communications Service of Russia, the Federal State 
Office of the Russian Post, the Interior Ministry, territorial branches of 
the Roshydromet hydrometeorological service, territorial branches of the 
forest guard, transport security units, hunting and fisheries oversight 
bodies, and bodies in charge of the geological exploration of mining 













The typology of entities proposed in the Concept Paper is imprecise. For 
example, the list of ‘affiliates’ does not include the structures of the Central 
Bank, while it is a known fact that some selected bank facilities are pro‑
tected by Rosgvardiya, and others by its in‑house Rosinkas organisation. 
Moreover, the Concept Paper preserves the status quo by blurring the line 
between the commercial and non ‑commercial segments of state security.
The structures listed above perform their tasks in accord with Ros‑
gvardiya, which also supervises them. However, it does not supervise 
the elaborate security system of the Russian Federation, from the Fed‑
eral Security Service to the Federal Penitentiary Service. Those institu‑
tions are not required to agree the lists of the facilities they protect or to 
report the firearms they hold to Rosgvardiya’s registers. This also applies 
to the Ministry of Defence, but not to the Ministry of Emergencies whose 
security structures are overseen by Rosgvardiya and which features in 
Rosgvardiya’s inspection schedules.
4. The private security sector
Compared with the security organisations established by the state agen‑
cies and strategic state ‑owned companies, the private security business 
does not pose a major problem today. The Kremlin has no intention of 
dismantling the 22,800 security companies which, according to public 
sources, employ between 650,000 and 1.5 million people39. Most of this 
workforce are functionaries and military personnel moved to the reserve, 
for whom this is an additional source of income. This situation is being 
perpetuated by the high qualifications required of people seeking jobs at 
security contractors, including prohibitive specialist exams that former 
police functionaries and military personnel are capable of passing.
39 This number of private security contractors has been officially stated by Ros gvardiya. 
It matches the information disclosed back in 2013 by the Interior Ministry, which 
estimated the size of this workforce at 650,000. The discrepancies between official 
statistics and unofficial numbers probably stem from differences in methodology, 













Outsourcing security tasks to private contractors is seen as a way for the 
state to fulfil some of its public functions and to sponsor companies that 
perform special tasks within the framework of the so‑called state ‑private 
partnership. The state has informal instruments to inspect such compa‑
nies independently of Rosgvardiya’s structures. Their managers are typ‑
ically high ‑ranking functionaries of the institutions of force, including 
officers of the so‑called active reserve of the FSB. They are state agents 
who enter the structures of business, the media and social organisations. 
It is difficult to establish the number of these officers working in active 
reserve, but Russian commentators estimate that there are thousands 
of them40.
Seen as notoriously corrupt and criminogenic, the private security busi‑
ness had already been put under rigorous regulation. Comprehensive 
corrective measures were undertaken in 2010 when security contractors 
were forced to go through repeat registration procedures. This was done 
under the pretext of renaming the category of the entities from private 
security ‘companies’ to private security ‘organisations’, which was also 
reflected in the language used when speaking about them: the infamous 
‘chops’ (Russian: частные охранные предприятия) started to be referred 
to as ‘choo’ (частные охранные организации)41. According to the Interior 
Ministry, the number of licenced security operatives decreased by 8% 
at that time, from 718,700 to 662,500. The security organisations were 
obliged to submit dactyloscopy records of their personnel and stripped 
of the right to own firearms for professional use – they had to hand their 
firearms over to the police without compensation (currently they can 
only lease their weapons). The move made the security business fully 
dependent on the local police authorities, which had the right to con‑
fiscate weapons, putting the contractors at risk of losing contracts and 
40 For more information see: A. Soldatov, I. Borogan, KGB/FSB. Władcy Rosji, Warszawa 
2015, pp. 48–55.
41 М. Фалалеев, ‘Чоп и чип. 700 тысяч частных охранников сдадут электронные 














going bankrupt. Those powers have now been taken over by Rosgvardiya, 
which exercises them in relation to both private security contractors and 
actors in the state (government ‑provided) security sector.
The problems related to the private security business which Rosgvardiya 
has been highlighting42 do not so much concern licenced security oper‑
atives, who mostly hail from the state institutions of force, as repre‑
sentatives of the SAVOK segment, which is a colloquial term used by the 
‘professionals’ to describe janitors, administrators, lift operators, on‑duty 
security and notification system operators and all types of inspectors. 
According to Rosgvardiya, such staff members often perform tasks that 
should be fulfilled by licenced operatives but are paid drastically low 
salaries. This, according to Rosgvardiya, explains why the private com‑
panies offer inferior quality services and dumping prices. To remedy 
the problem, Rosgvardiya has proposed draft amendments to the bill on 
private security contractors and the Administrative Code, under which 
fines for providing private security services in breach of the laws in force 
would be double the current levels.
5. A new order?
Reports about Rosgvardiya’s oversight activities suggest that they have 
been focused on the in‑house security organisations established within 
state institutions. Such structures are a relic of the 1990s and the early 
days of the market economy in Russia when the bureaucratic system 
started developing functions and acquiring assets unrelated to its core 
mission. The situation was exacerbated after 2010 in connection with 
the  20% cut in the Interior Ministry’s staff imposed as part of its re‑
form. It was achieved mainly by disbanding the units in charge of non‑
‑government ‑provided security, in a move of which the other ministries 
and federal agencies took advantage by expanding their own internal 
42 ‘Нелицензионные охранники могут поплатиться большими штрафами’, 













government ‑provided security assets. As some of the scandals which 
reached the media suggest, Svyaz ‑Bezopasnost and Spetssvyaz (agen‑
cies of the Ministry of Communications), Rosinkas (agency of the Cen‑
tral Bank of Russia) and the federal entity Vedomstvennaya Okhrana 
Promysh lennosti RF (Government ‑Provided Security of the Industry of 
the Russian Federation, i.e. a security undertaking of the Ministry of In‑
dustry) took advantage of legal loopholes and participated in tenders for 
public security contracts. For example, a state structure specialising in 
communications security for many years protected six private compa‑
nies in that sector (its competitors) and had won tenders for the provi‑
sion of security services to 184 facilities from outside its sector, including 
the Supreme Court of Tatarstan43.
In November 2018, Svyaz ‑Bezopasnost was incorporated into Rosgvardi‑
ya’s Okhrana company, and Spetssvyaz was punished by the confiscation 
of weapons for illegally convoying cash for commercial banks. The con‑
flict, which became a major, widely discussed scandal, was ultimately 
resolved by an interdepartmental commission established by the Min‑
istry of Communications, which ruled that facilities not connected with 
the communications sector, as well as convoys carrying products of the 
defence industry, would be secured jointly by Spetssvyaz and Rosgvardiya.
The mergers described above have broken out of old patterns in the 
state segment of the security business. While they do not yet seem to 
follow a  coherent concept for the integration of the security system 
of the state’s strategic facilities, they already integrate the offer of the 
state security institutions. The creation of the Centre for the Security of 
Industrial Facilities (which is taking over the security structures of the 
Ministry of Industry) as an affiliate of Okhrana, is a good illustration 
of this tendency to consolidate state security entities44. The centre has 
43 И. Петров, ‘Сторожевые шашни: реформа ведомственной охраны вылилась 
в скандал’, Известия, 3 July 2019, www.iz.ru.













the status of an affiliate. According to V. Kvasov and O. Shkelya (cited 
above), that means it has the same status as Rosgvardiya’s Okhrana, i.e. is 
authorised to provide security to facilities from any category, owned by 
anyone, including facilities outside the industry sector45. However, some 
interpretational difficulty in this case is caused by Article 8 of the bill 
“On government ‑provided security”, which lays down a subordination 
requirement under which security undertakings to which the bill applies 
may only protect facilities managed by the ministry which established 
them. This may mean that an evident conflict of interest has been trans‑
formed into discreet cooperation.
Another piece of evidence suggesting that this kind of move from con‑
flict to cooperation is possible comes from the fuels sector where ‘affil‑
iated’ structures of Rosneft and Gazprom face no problems providing 
security services to the companies’ own installation, while Rosgvardiya 
has stripped private energy concerns of the right to select their security 
providers. That move has already been challenged by the chiefs of  Luk oil, 
Tatneft and Sibur who have filed a complaint with the Secretary of the 
Security Council Nikolai Patrushev46. They have emphasised a drastic 
increase in the cost of security – the prices charged by Rosgvardiya’s 
Okhrana are double those offered by private agencies. This marks another 
Russian paradox: the costs of state ‑provided security services are higher 
than the costs of private providers. Back in 2018, the Moscow ‑based Main 
Centre for Special Communications (FGUP GCSS), a company dealing 
with the protection of the courier service, also complained about Rosg‑
vardiya’s excessive prices, after Rosgvardiya had stripped it of the right 
to use weapons and made it unable to protect convoys. The   company 
ultimately selected the offer of the Communications  Ministry’s Svyaz‑
‑Bezopasnost, ostentatiously rejecting Rosgvardiya’s offer.
45 В.Б. Квасов, О.В. Шкеля, ‘Проблемы правового регулирования…’, op. cit.














Triggering conflicts in order to resolve them in Rosgvardiya’s favour is 
a radical technique for eliminating competitors. The routine method is for 
Rosgvardiya to conduct audits and revoke licences and authorisations 
to use weapons. Information on the subject is available on Rosgvardi‑
ya’s website and in media reports about their planned and implemented 
audits. In 2018 Rosgvardiya conducted a total of 51,333 audits, including 
31,157 planned ones and 20,176 unannounced ones47. It has emphasised 
the systemic nature of detected irregularities – the security companies 
employ persons with criminal records and non ‑expunged convictions 
and without the psychological certificates required of people using 
weapons, physical force and coercive measures. Gaps in the dactyloscopy 
registers of staff have also been detected, as well as missing periodic 
medical examinations and certificates of completion of professional 
training. Companies dealing with government ‑provided security have 
been accused of working at facilities outside their respective sectors. 
Finally, there have been multiple irregularities involving the handling 
of weapons, including depots that do not meet the requirements, missing 
documentation on distributed weapons and other special equipment, and 
discrepancies between actual inventories and registers, etc.
A separate section on the website deals with audits in the fuels and energy 
sector where 3,475 were conducted in 2018, which found cases of techni‑
cal security, alarm and CCTV monitoring systems not meeting Russian 
standards, the lack of appropriate lighting, and cases of non ‑compliance 
with the rules on anti ‑terror preventative measures. The brief report on 
audits in the fuels sector contains an interesting detail: 837 fines have 
been imposed on the security firms of the fuels sector, including one 
of more than RUB 16 million, of which RUB 13,256,000 has been paid. 
For comparison, in the aftermath of 190 audits at critical infrastructure 
facilities, fines totalling RUB 7 million have been paid to the state budget.
47 See: ‘Информация о реализации в 2018 году функций Росгвардии по осущест‑
влению федерального государственного контроля (надзора) в установленных 













The above ‑mentioned “Concept paper on the development of non‑govern‑
ment‑provided security in the years 2018–2021 and to 2025” sheds light 
on the objectives of Rosgvardiya’s oversight activities. It consolidates its 
monopoly position, expanding its oversight powers to: technology poli‑
cies in the security sector (technical security systems and the research 
and development of such systems, for which the Okhrana Research and 
Development Centre has been established); the strict categorisation of 
state facilities under Rosgvardiya’s protection and the issuance of ‘pass‑
ports’ to such facilities, as well as the mandatory inclusion of anti ‑terror 
security regulations into the procedures.
Rosgvardiya’s audits have created significant tension in the crowded se‑
curity market. Conflicts of interest between Rosgvardiya and the compa‑
nies it controls have been routinely resolved in Rosgvardiya’s favour by 
the Anti ‑Monopoly Office and the courts. The defeated competitors have 
tried to take revenge on Rosgvardiya by releasing compromising materials, 
leaking confidential information and sensitive data. Indirectly, the state 
administration and the intelligence services are also involved in the pub‑
lic conflicts. For example, the post ‑audit investigation at the Government‑
‑Provided Security of Industrial Facilities company ended with the arrest 
of the company’s managers, FSB colonel Andrei  Polshchikov and two FSB 
generals: Sergei Gorbunov (military counterintelligence) and Vladimir 
Podolsky (former commander of the Vympel spetsnaz and deputy chief 
of the FSB Special Headquarters). They were initially accused of embez‑
zlement and of employing family members and so‑called ‘dead souls’, and 
were fined. After the criminal trial was resumed, they were additionally 
charged with obstruction of justice and of plotting an assassination of 
one of the investigators. Similar examples abound.
Rosgvardiya’s opponents track its illegal practices and systematically 
document its abuses, cases of corruption48, and overpriced purchases. 
48 ‘Экс‑командира отряда ФГУП «Охрана» Росгвардии обвиняют в получении 













In 2017, a shooting in the car park of the Moscow ‑City mall attracted a lot 
of attention – it was described as a violent showdown between a Ros‑
gvardiya unit protecting the mafia boss Dmitry Pavlov (Pavlik) and the 
bodyguards of Gavril Yushvaev (Garik).
Rosgvardiya has also been criticised by the state recipients of the security 
services. In one example, the Ministry of Culture accused Rosgvardiya’s 
Okhrana of serious shortcomings after auditing its security services in 
the aftermath of a series of incidents in its museums, including the theft 
of a valuable painting from the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow and the 
destruction of a painting from the Hermitage collection in St Peters‑
burg49. Accusations that Rosgvardiya destroys its competitors in the 
security services market have also been increasingly frequent. Private 
security agencies, which compete with Rosgvardiya on prices and their 
offer, have been levelling increasing criticism at the company. They have 
demonstrated that Rosgvardiya charges higher prices for its services 
despite having lower costs as it can use the weapons, equipment and 
vehicles of the Rosgvardiya troops free of charge, and does not face any 
restrictions on the use of weapons or consequences for failing to follow 
procedures as Rosgvardiya’s Okhrana is overseen by Rosgvardiya itself.
Thus, Rosgvardiya’s efforts, officially represented as corrective measures, 
have given rise to public conflicts. It is evident that the underlying causes 
of the conflicts are systemic. The old model of state security provision 
is being dismantled inconsistently and chaotically. State ‑owned assets 
are still protected by sectoral security organisations, even as some facil‑
ities have been put in the charge of Rosgvardiya which delivers (non‑
‑government ‑provided) security services to them. Conflicts are also 
generated by the arbitrary nature of the decisions of the government 
and the president, who approve the lists of facilities that are not allowed 
49 ‘Минкультуры установило, что Росгвардия охраняет музеи с «недоработ‑













to use private security services or which are mandatorily protected by 
Rosgvardiya, as well as the tariffs for the state security services.
The wide and criminogenic security business has proven very diffi‑
cult to reform. Its commercial segment continues to expand while 
its implicit objective, which is to support the reserve security and 
defence personnel, has not been helpful either in attaining the offi‑
cially declared objectives of generating savings and putting the sec‑
tor in order, or in fixing its criminogenic model.
6. An omnipotent supervisor?
The Kremlin has always treated security contractors as not only a way 
to assist the police and military personnel moved to the reserve, but also 
as its own mobilisation reserve enabling the formation of special units 
at times of war. The planning of territorial defence as part of the state 
military systems is the task of the Defence Ministry. The ministry also 
supervises the retraining of reserve personnel, which is also obligatory 
for the Federal Security Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Fed‑
eral Protective Service and Rosgvardiya50.
At least for this reason, Rosgvardiya is not an omnipotent supervisor. 
This applies both to the system for the protection of the state’s critical 
infrastructure, which also involves the Ministry of Defence, the Interior 
Ministry, the Federal Security Service and the Federal Protective Ser‑
vice (over which Rosgvardiya has no influence) and the supervision of 
security contractors. Rosgvardiya’s involvement in territorial defence 
is supposed to be furthered by the development of closer cooperation 
between itself and the Cossacks51. This cooperation materialises as the 
50 Ю. Гаврилов, ‘Запасной полк’, Российская газета, 24 February 2019; content of 
a presidential decree appointing reserve forces available at www.rg.ru.
51 ‘Первая в России казачья рота Росгвардии укомплектована в Краснодарском 
крае’, TASS, 20 February 2018. Nikolai Doluda, the Kuban Host ataman quoted by 













nominally ‘Cossack’ security organisations, officially treated as a kind of 
state sponsoring of Cossack associations (troops). In reality, the Russian 
Cossacks are the subject of the Kremlin’s special attention, intermedi‑
ated by the Council for Cossack Affairs appointed by the President of 
the Russian Federation. Rosgvardiya has expressed interest in expand‑
ing the scope of the Cossack security service because of the vastness 
of the Russian territory and the existence of numerous strategic facil‑
ities in sparsely populated areas, especially in Siberia and the Far East. 
The  growth of Cossack security services is also visible in numerous 
incidents involving these formations, including cases of security con‑
tracts signed without proper tender procedures and the growing num‑
ber of Cossack attacks on the Kremlin’s political opponents, including 
several beatings of Alexei Navalny and the breaking up of Hare Krishna 
gatherings, LGBT demonstrations, etc.52 The expansion of Rosgvardiya’s 
activities is also visible in the fact that Cossack organisations have been 
included in the list of Okhrana affiliates. It is worth noting here that 
prior to the creation of Rosgvardiya, the conditions for Cossack security 
activities were not prohibitive; for instance, it was enough to complete 
a course for ‘assistant community police officers’ to be able to join the 
patrol service. However, the Cossack experiment is a new phenomenon 
in the security domain and may be regarded as a political and military 
project of the Kremlin’s. Its objectives include mobilising the Russian 
public in the face of the so‑called new threats (illegal migration, extrem‑
ism, terrorism, cultural and spiritual threats, cybercrime, Western infor‑
mation warfare). The Cossack troops list the countering of such threats 
in their statutes53.
Other similar new political ‑military projects include the so‑called social 
defence organisations (associations of the former intelligence service, 
military and police officers, local guards, etc.) which perform outsourced 
52 For more information, see: J.  Darczewska, Putin’s Cossacks. Folklore, Business or 
Politics?, OSW, Warszawa 2017, www.osw.waw.pl.
53 Their framework statute was approved by Vladimir Putin’s decree no.  543 of 













public tasks as part of the so‑called public ‑private partnership. Some of 
those structures are organisations with openly stated objectives, such 
as security structures created by local authorities including: the Munici‑
pal Guard (Belgorod), Public Order Protection (Togliatti), the Security 
Centre (Ufa), the Centre for the Protection of Public Order (St Peters‑
burg). Some, such as the Capital City Security company established by the 
government of Moscow, have the status of private security contractors 
and – additionally – the status of a strategic company. Most of them were 
established in the early 2010s. A new tendency can be observed where the 
local authorities build closer co‑operation with volunteer security opera‑
tives joining the government ‑inspired volunteer teams for the protection 
of order and the so‑called social self ‑defence teams. Those formations 
have made their presence known, for example by breaking up gatherings 
of people protesting against development in forest and park areas.
In 2010 members of such groups and the Cossacks constituted the core of 
the volunteer mobilisation reserve. Today, they constitute the core of the 
contract service reserve54. This social experiment was triggered on the 
basis of the 2012 bill No. 288 which amended a range of legislative acts 
concerning defence, including the bill on compulsory military service. 
The experiment has many objectives; for instance it creates an imitation 
of the involvement of citizens and offers a platform to use reservists in 
areas where the existing security and defence forces are insufficient, and 
to train them to meet current tasks and needs.
Reservists may be trained at ‘specialised vocational institutions’, which 
include private military companies (Russian: частная военная компания, 
ChVK). They are sometimes compared to with the Western PMC (private 
military companies), although the two are not equivalent. There have 
54 Initial contracts with reservists are signed for three years, and subsequently for 
five years. Soldiers sign contracts which terminate when they turn 42. For junior 
officers they terminate when they turn 47. For officers they terminate at 52. For 
senior officers, at 57. Reservists are paid a soldier’s salary for taking part in a 30‑day 













been descriptions of excesses by Russian contractors during the Chechen 
wars; abroad they have been seen during the fighting in the former Yugo‑
slavia, in Georgia, in Crimea and in Syria. In Sudan, Zimbabwe, Angola, 
Libya and Madagascar they provide different services including personal 
protection, facility security, police and military training and even the 
organisation of election campaigns in return for the right to mine natural 
resources55.
Because of reports in the foreign media, the topic of ChVK has also 
emerged in the media in Russia, which paid special attention to attempts 
at legalising these companies. Journalists usually suggested that the exist‑
ence of such companies was illegal under Russian law. However, it is not 
so much their involvement in the militarised security market which is 
illegal, as their participation in war operations56. This, incidentally, has 
been subject to the Kremlin’s information blockade. Officially, the com‑
panies provide security services, protecting Russian facilities outside 
the Russian Federation, including mines, oil fields and convoys, and per‑
form training missions (military advice, the training of troops and police 
forces) in countries with which Russian cooperates in those domains. 
They may also have contracts with the Russian Defence Ministry. As dis‑
closed by Dmitry Kiselyov, members of the Wagner Group have been 
training the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic under a bilat‑
eral agreement between the Defence Ministries of the two countries57. 
The resistance against calls to legalise them is understandable because 
that would lead to undesirable consequences, including the need to make 
55 ‘«Проект»: наемники «ЧВК Вагнера» охраняли на Мадагаскаре связанных 
с Пригожкиным политтехнологов’, Новая Газета, 13 March 2019, www.novaya‑
gazeta.ru.
56 In Russia, their activities are governed by the law “On security and detective ser‑
vices”: they are treated as economic operators providing security services. In early 
2018, legislative works were undertaken on the initiative of the Just Russia party on 
a separate, dedicated regulation, but the draft was rejected (having been rejected 
twice before, in 2011 and in 2014). The Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the FSB and Rosgvardiya objected to the new regulation, arguing that it 
would contravene the Russian constitution.













their statutory tasks more transparent, to impose legal accountability for 
violations of the law, etc.
It is worth noting that the emergence of the topic of ChVKs in the pub‑
lic debate has led to a change of the public’s view and the government’s 
attitude. Back in 2013, the commanders of the Slavic Corps ChVK were 
arrested in front of cameras at the Domodedovo airport on their return 
from Syria, and condemned for recruiting mercenaries58. In 2018, the 
Russian media quoted the ChVK Wagner commanders as saying that 
they are “fighting for Russia and its geopolitical interests”59. This change 
has in large part been due to an information and PR campaign which the 
 military have been conducting for the last several years. This campaign 
has been conducted in various fields. For example, Gen. Leonid Ivashov 
has emphasised that the providers of commercial military security ser‑
vices are high ‑class specialists in military intelligence, military lawyers 
and members of the Special Operations Forces, while the army’s law‑
yers have argued that outsourcing in the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation and other military forces was necessary60.
Russian ChVKs differ from the Western model. PMCs are private busi‑
nesses providing military services, while ChVKs do not fit into that cate‑
gory. They are established and trained using the resources of the Russian 
58 Slavonic Corps Limited, a company registered in Hong Kong, took part in the fight‑
ing in Syria. The arrested commanders defended themselves by claiming that they 
had been hired by the Syrian Ministry of Energy and the Energia company. Their 
arrest should be interpreted as a  cost that Russian had to pay to maintain the 
appearance of neutrality in the Syrian conflict (at that time the Kremlin officially 
denied that Russia was involved even as the global media reported on the deaths 
of Russian fighters, providing their personal information on the basis of Russian 
documents found).
59 ‘Командиры рассказали о внутренней политике ЧВК Вагнера и жизни наем‑
ников’, Lenta.Ru, 7 March 2018.
60 ‘Легализация ЧВК: аргумент «их там нет» больше не работает’, Новые Изве‑
стия, 24  July  2018, www.newizv.ru. See also: А.В. Сорокин, ‘Целесообразность 
научного исследования теории и практики использования аутсорсинговых 
отношений в сфере хозяйственно‑экономической деятельности военных орга‑













military forces and other institutions of force, and use the bases and medi‑
cal facilities of the official army and other institutions. As documented by 
numerous reports in the global media, ChVK Wagner prepared to fight in 
Syria at the Molkino base61, using the range of the 10th Spetsnaz Brigade 
of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation.
In this sense, ChVKs are (albeit informally) part of the Russian military 
structures. They have little to do with commercial activities based on 
economic calculation. There is truth in the statement that while West‑
ern PMCs are mercenaries dressed up as soldiers, Russian ChVKs are 
soldiers dressed up as mercenaries62. As companies providing cover, and 
extensions of the Russian institutions of force, they can contribute to the 
accomplishment of those institutions’ non ‑statutory tasks. They provide 
services to the state. There are not there to achieve economic efficiency, 
but to support the state’s internal and foreign policy. They operate under 
the state’s close supervision. This supervision also needs to be extended 
to state ‑owned and private security contractors, as each form of unsu‑
pervised entity poses a threat as it may potentially undermine the exist‑
ing order, while the entire philosophy of governance of the Russian state 
is focused on ensuring ‘peace and quiet’, i.e. protecting the existing order.
In Russia, the distinction between state and non ‑state security pro‑
viders ceases to be relevant. The demand for security services is met, 
for a fee, by whole segments of the state apparatus, including the 
institutions of force. And conversely, ChVKs or Cossack security 
companies should not be regarded as private actors. Many of such 
private companies provide services to the state and do not oper‑
ate according to the logic of economic efficiency. Their mission is 
to soften or neutralise political risk (e.g. by concealing military 
involvement or covering up information about casualties) and in 
61 ‘Появились фотографии базы ЧВК на Кубани’, Lenta.Ru, 5 March 2018.
62 P. Mazur, ‘Wagnerowcy w Syrii – wykorzystanie PMC przez Rosję w konflikcie syryj‑














this way to support Russia’s internal and foreign policy. Hidden 
behind their official identity as security contractors, such entities 
can rely on the material and technical support of the Armed Forces, 
implement various military and non ‑military tasks in peacetime as 
well as during and after conflicts, and provide a trained operational 













CONCLUSION: ROSGVARDIYA AS THE ICONIC  
‘GUARD OF PEACE AND ORDER’
Assessments of the Russian intelligence services should be formulated 
bearing in mind the scale of disinformation and manipulation. Such 
distortions are present even in the official statements by Rosgvardiya’s 
chief and reports posted on the service’s website and they have dom‑
inated the information campaign accompanying its establishment. For 
instance, President Putin emphasised the need to establish firearms 
inspections and to put the security services business in order, while also 
raising the savings argument, according to which the concentration of 
the security structures dispersed in different government departments 
in one service would lower their costs. Others traditionally highlighted 
the threats of terrorism and extremism, which Rosgvardiya would help 
counter. Finally, an analysis of the Rosgvardiya’s own Centre for Strategic 
Research argued that its primary task would concern territorial defence, 
which needed to be strengthened in response to the hostile, anti ‑Russian 
actions by Western states (colour revolutions, Western information and 
ideological warfare).
The opposition added to the confusion by focusing on corruption, the 
‘moral’ exhaustion and decay of Rosgvardiya’s predecessor, i.e. the Inter‑
nal Troops and the Interior Ministry in charge of them (which was alleg‑
edly excessively involved in the security business while neglecting its 
primary role of combatting crime). Moreover, the opposition tradition‑
ally put the new service in the context of the rivalry between services 
(claiming that Putin had “lost trust in the FSB”) and the Kremlin’s fears 
of uncontrollable internal developments, of which the clichés of a ‘Pre‑
torian guard’ and ‘new oprichnina’ may serve as an illustration.
This interpretive chaos continues today, even though after almost four 
years of Rosgvardiya’s functioning it is easier to pinpoint the actual char‑
acter of the service. For example, it is notable that the task assigned to 













plished: the commercial and criminogenic segment has continued to grow. 
The half ‑measures implemented have blurred Rosgvardiya’s character as 
a state service. Its functioning has not been transparent. The size of the 
commercial segment, whose workforce currently accounts for more than 
half of Rosgvardiya’s total personnel, shows what the service’s systemic 
‘original sin’ is about – Rosgvardiya is involved in the security business 
as a service provider while at the same time overseeing its competitors 
in the state and private security contractor market.
There are more paradoxes of this kind. To promote Rosgvardiya’s security 
services, its two mutually contradictory dimensions are constantly high‑
lighted: the service is simultaneously represented as a military organisa‑
tion (orderly, hierarchical, based on rules and bylaws), and as a business 
providing security services (commercial, profit ‑oriented and lobbying 
for favourable legal regulations). By providing selective state security 
under contracts (i.e. protecting businesses and citizens who are prepared 
to pay for security) the very existence of the service demonstrates that 
the Russian state is failing to ensure security to its citizens.
The arguments used in the public debate also fail to answer the question 
about Rosgvardiya’s original contribution to the operational machine of 
the Russian state. The competence bill “On the National Guard troops”, 
which defines the service’s tasks and powers, does not identify new 
operational areas for Rosgvardiya. The service is defined as an auxiliary 
military organisation established to support other government institu‑
tions of force in the areas of territorial and civil defence, border protec‑
tion, and the countering of terrorism and extremism. At the same time, 
it is a policing and intervention force supporting the Interior Ministry. 
Its specific tasks are only enumerated in the Rosgvardiya bylaws. They 
include “federal oversight of the trade in firearms for civilian and pro‑
fessional use”, “oversight of private security and detective service pro‑
viders” as well as selected state “units for government ‑provided security” 
and “units with special statutory tasks”. This list of tasks does not in any 













assigned to the Rosgvardiya leadership to keep it in constant combat 
readiness and to develop and expand its structures. Moreover, contrary 
to how Rosgvardiya is represented, its military and combat competences 
do not make it a regular, full ‑fledged special troop formation – it remains 
an army with policing tasks.
Nor is Rosgvardiya a full ‑fledged intelligence service. Unlike the other 
intelligence services of the Russian Federation and the Interior Ministry, 
it has no operational and investigative powers or powers to prosecute 
and indict. It does, though, have the potential to engage in such activ‑
ities – its oversight function gives it unlimited access to registers and 
databases, allows it to recruit secret collaborators, covertly obtain data, 
tap phone calls and put people under observation. Rosgvardiya is cer‑
tainly making use of this potential, and the oversight it performs of the 
trade in firearms and the activities of security contractors enables it to 
infiltrate the groups in possession of firearms, check them, and collect 
evidence of dealings that might pose a threat to the security of the Rus‑
sian Federation, etc.
Assuming that the dominant narrative about Rosgvardiya is there to 
justify and legitimise its institutional position in the Russian system of 
power, it is worth looking beyond that narrative and considering it in 
a wider and longer context. Below is a list of several tendencies that are 
omitted from the official narrative.
Firstly, Rosgvardiya was established to expand and consolidate the 
community of the institutions of force to better support Russia’s 
authoritarian system.
An important element of the transformation of the system of government 
after the breakup of the Soviet Union concerned a deep transformation 
of the institutions of force. It involved dismantling the former KGB and 
the emergence of weaker and mutually counterbalancing Ministries of 













(Foreign Intelligence Service), counterintelligence (Federal Security Ser‑
vice), security (Federal Protective Service), border protection (Federal 
Border Service), communications security (Federal Agency of Govern‑
ment Communications and Information, FAPSI).
Another significant aspect of the transformation concerned the estab‑
lishment of numerous private security contractors working for the new 
Russian business sector. As the former nomenklatura of the institutions 
of force entered the field of business, many people formerly working in 
the army and the intelligence services started moving into politics and 
the economy. Vladimir Putin’s rise to power was marked by an expan‑
sion of the political influence of these people, but also reinforced the 
previous tendencies. The political narrative employed at that time (about 
“restoring order and strong government”) emphasised the need to intro‑
duce some order into the economy while preserving democratic free‑
doms (as far as possible in Russian conditions, whose limitations came 
to be reflected in the term ‘managed democracy’). ‘Order’ in the economy 
gave rise to state capitalism with its limitations on private ownership. 
The inevitable consequence of that involved the build‑up of new security 
institutions to protect the state ‑owned business assets, i.e. the expansion 
of the sectors of government ‑provided and non ‑government ‑provided 
security. The expansion of the state security sector was also intended 
to curb the private security sector: efforts were made to reverse Rus‑
sia’s strong tendency towards the privatisation of business security by 
nationalising it; the official justification pointed to the need to restore 
the state’s monopoly on the use of force.
However, the nationalisation of the security sector (based on weak legal 
regulations) did not reverse the growth of crime within the institutions 
of force. The dismantling of the most crime ‑ridden services (i.e. FAPSI 
in 2003, and FSKN in 2016) and the transfer of the commercial security 
structures from the Interior Ministry to Rosgvardiya (in 2016) may be 
interpreted as ad hoc steps taken to combat the most striking manifesta‑













as demonstrated by the statistics on crime within Rosgvardiya itself 63. 
The underlying causes of the security sector’s criminogenic nature 
(which also involves the extortion of public contracts and tax breaks) 
are mainly systemic. Of particular importance here is the professional 
profile of the former security functionaries working in the sector, who 
have connections in the state institutions and know how to use opera‑
tional methods, including ways to exploit compromising materials. 
At the same time, officers with experience in the institutions of force, 
who are part of an army of persons holding weapons, are an asset for 
the  Kremlin as its social backing. In this context, the political meaning 
of the establishment of Rosgvardiya may be interpreted as follows: 
its oversight of the security contractors is a warning to undisci‑
plined representatives of the security business and a call for self‑
‑restraint. The Kremlin has chosen not to use drastic means that 
could trigger a ‘civil war’, and instead decided to appeal to the sense 
of community among those authorised to use force and their sense 
of responsibility for the internal situation in Russia, while prom‑
ising to keep the existing order. For the same reason any organi‑
sational changes in the Russian institutions of force have recently 
been cautious, technical and insular. A ‘thorough clean‑up’ is not an 
option also for more fundamental reasons: disorder is the sector’s 
normal state as it expands the services’ spectrum of capabilities.
Secondly, in the longer term perspective, Rosgvardiya should be 
considered in the context of the modernisation of Russia’s inter‑
nal security forces. This process has involved: the reforms in the Inte‑
rior Ministry implemented gradually since 2010; the civil defence force 
reform undertaken in  2011 (whereby units of the Ministry for Civil 
Defence and Emergencies were transformed into military search and 
rescue formations); and the reform of territorial defence. The univer‑
sal justification for those modernisation efforts has concerned the 














involvement of all the institutions of force in territorial defence 
and civil defence, which requires them to improve co‑operation and 
interoperability. Joint drills, including unannounced readiness tests, 
as well as unified equipment and arms standards, the introduction of 
military bylaws, etc., all contribute to the ‘militarisation’ and alignment 
of the internal security forces. The distinction between peacetime and 
wartime tasks, which is being successively introduced into the bylaws of 
the ministries and services – and which is also reflected in Rosgvardiya’s 
bylaws – also serves the same purpose.
It would be difficult to overestimate the role of Rosgvardiya in safeguard‑
ing state of emergency and martial law regimes and deploying units for 
wartime, not least because of its human resource potential. Obliged to 
train and retrain its own mobilisation reserve, it can accomplish this 
task more easily as it is also authorised to oversee the ‘hidden’ reserve 
potential, i.e. people holding arms. The practice in Russia is for wartime 
civil defence and territorial defence tasks to be performed by security 
and rescue services, as well as the reserve of the security and defence 
forces. The latter has recently received a new financial stimulus in the 
form of a soldier’s salary offered to contract service reservists.
Modernisation is not only about replacing weapons and equipment with 
newer generations. It is also about restarting and restructuring the sys‑
tem, improving its operational capacity and efficacy, intensive training 
and doctrine adjustment. Until recently, efforts in those fields have been 
focused on the armed forces, which have been the main justification for 
Russia’s imperial aspirations and ambitions. Modernisation of the inter‑
nal security sector may serve to tighten control of society in Russia and 
enforce obedience, but it may also be a sign of preparations for wartime.
The stated aim of modernisation today is to strengthen the state’s mili‑
tary organisation. This is a notion that refers to many aspects, spans all 
the institutions of force, the defence industry and infrastructure, as well 













enhance the country’s defence potential. In the Russian legal and political 
culture, the military organisation of the state offers no space for bot‑
tom‑up initiatives: measures to enhance defence are initiated top ‑down 
and implemented in a controlled way. The military organisation of 
society (which is called for as part the efforts to strengthen the 
military defence structures) is represented as opening the state’s 
military system to civil society initiatives and a way to build closer 
relations with society. In reality, it is about strengthening the force‑
‑based mechanisms of governance for the Russian state, its secu‑
rity and society under the pretext of preparations for emergency 
situations.
It is inappropriate in this context to invoke the experiences of other 
countries, and especially the French Gendarmerie and the tradition of 
the National Guard to which it refers. The French territorial defence was 
founded on the idea of the ‘people in arms’, i.e. a civil society capable of 
self ‑organising. In Russia there is no space for such an idea as it has no 
civil society. Out of necessity, the Russian model relies on various organ‑
isational substitutes of civil society (the Cossacks, ChVKs). The ‘people 
in arms’ are subject to strict licencing procedures. By supervising them 
and keeping registers of them Rosgvardiya supervises a ‘hidden’ poten‑
tial and a mobilisation reserve – and especially its most active segments.
Unlike in the Western model of territorial defence, where reserve forces 
are used predominantly to defend the country’s territory, the Russian 
model clearly assumes that those forces will perform multiple functions. 
They can be used for internal security as well external, expedition‑
ary operations. The ‘people in arms’ (5 million persons holding 7 mil‑
lion weapons according to Rosgvardiya’s estimates) are simultaneously 
a reserve pool of personnel for the armed forces during wartime, opera‑
tives to perform non ‑statutory operations in peacetime, and an extension 














Thirdly, it is worth noting the symbolic dimension of the  service. 
The establishment of Rosgvardiya marked the return of the cate‑
gory of ‘internal threats’ to the political discourse in Russia. 
Any  question about Rosgvardiya is simultaneously a question about 
the Kremlin’s understanding of these threats. This dimension reveals 
a change in the Kremlin’s information policy in the field of security. Pre‑
viously, that policy was limited to blocking information about threats and 
making it a taboo subject. Currently, there is an oversupply of informa‑
tion, aimed at artificially publicising internal threats. Introducing this 
topic into public discourse serves various purposes. Internally, it high‑
lights the military might and the ‘extraordinary’ potential of the security 
forces, concealed under different kinds of camouflage. Externally, it pro‑
jects an image of the determination, combat readiness and the mobility 
of all the Russian institutions of force.
This change in the model of communication does not mean that the 
Kremlin has given up disinformation and propaganda as impor‑
tant instruments in governing the state and the society. Tools of 
this kind enable it to use ready ‑made clichés to strengthen the pic‑
ture or reality it creates. This picture includes elements such as the 
‘morally corrupt West’, the declining civilisation’s helplessness and 
inability to make decisions, the activity of foreign agents, extrem‑
ists and saboteurs, as opposed to the Russian internal order which 
protects peace and traditional values.
Internal threats represented as an external menace that highlights the 
image of the West as the eternal enemy, an antagonist of Russia and inciter 
of colour revolutions, all serve to justify Russia’s aggressive policies and 
the Kremlin’s turn towards a progressing militarisation of power in Rus‑
sia (from the lowest to the highest levels) and the mobilisation of the 
society. This manipulation enables the Russian leadership to use, in their 
internal communications, social didactic codes that are easy to under‑
stand for the Russian public as they refer to necessary self ‑defence, the 













justification of the turn towards mobilisation (the perceived threat of 
‘hybrid’ Western aggression against Russia) has been drip ‑fed into the 
Russian security doctrines and strategies since 2000. The ‘defence’ of 
Russia against Western aggression (even though no‑one doubts that the 
Russian strategic documents mean attack, not defence) encompasses not 
only military objectives, but – most importantly – society. Rosgvardiya 
embodies the ideas underlying this ‘defence’: it guarantees order, peace 
and quiet, and preserves the continuity of tradition as the successor of 
the Internal Guard, the NKVD and the Internal Troops (see Appendix 2).
As explained by contemporary scholars of the history of Russian special 
services, the idea of a guard protecting those values has always been 
strongly present in Russia, irrespective of the changing historical cir‑
cumstances and systems of government (tsarist Russia, Soviet Union, 
Russian Federation). It has also always served to foster stability and the 
Russian modernisation projects (including in the Stalinist era of raging 
state terror).
In this context, Rosgvardiya is a new embodiment of the Russian practice 
of regime stabilisation that involves reinforcing its pillars and backup 
forces, which are treated as instruments to implement the Kremlin’s 
projects. Over time, reforms of the special services have been variously 
justified, but they always aimed at ensuring the stability of government 
and the integrity of its apparatus. This is also why every historical period 
has seen the Russian militarised security services combine their security 
role with extensive oversight and policing functions (see Appendix 1).
It should also be remembered that the continuity of this phenomenon, and 
the symbolism of memory that reflects it, has a civilisational context and 
is closely intertwined with the Russian political culture. The deep mean‑
ing of ‘order’ is a vertical, centralised state apparatus and an efficient 
system of repression. Order in this sense justifies the means employed to 
secure it, including maximum control of society, which sometimes takes 













foreign agents, the fifth column, corrupt officials), as well as the constant 
monitoring of public sentiment to identify and prosecute any manifesta‑
tions of treason. By analogy, ‘peace and quiet’ stands for system stability, 
its perpetuation, system integrity and unity. The institutions of force are 
the pillars of this system: obedient, loyal, enjoying a privileged position 
in the system, mobilising the government’s helpers, and demobilising its 
opponents. By using their potential and managing fear, the Kremlin is 















Appendix 1. Rosgvardiya’s long memory: “guarding peace 
and quiet for more than 200 years”
According to the official interpretation, Rosgvardiya’s traditions date 
back to  1811, when the Internal Guard was established. Tsar Alexan‑
der I appointed his trusted aide‑de‑camp, Count J. Komarovsky as the 
guard’s commander. Governmental historians studying the history of the 
Russian services64 emphasise the antinomy in the way the guard was 
viewed, as it was treated from the beginning as both a security force and 
an element in the state’s military organisation. Armed battalions of the 
guard were established in all the governorates’ capital cities, and their 
tasks included: helping in the execution of court convictions, pursuing 
and arresting robbers and thieves, breaking up gatherings, eliminating 
rebels, searching for fugitives and deserters, detecting forbidden mer‑
chandise imported into the Empire, supporting the collection of taxes, 
protecting order during religious ceremonies and in marketplaces and 
fairs, organising the conscription of recruits to the tsar’s army, convoying 
recruits, detainees and prisoners of war, and providing fire and flood 
response (in addition to military tasks).
When the tsar was toppled in 1917, the Internal Guard was briefly renamed 
VOKhR (Military Security of the Republic), and then as the Cheka/GPU/
OGPU/NKVD. In the Soviet Union it was assigned additional tasks related 
to protecting the strategic facilities of the administrative, industrial and 
communications infrastructure, and established specialised internal, 
border and convoy units.
The war with Poland in 1939 and the German strike on the Soviet Union 
in June 1941 became a turning point for the NKVD (People’s Commissariat 
64 П.А. Колпаков, ‘Внутренняя стража и Отдельный корпус внутренней стражи 













for Internal Affairs). During the war, the task of NKVD forces was to 
prevent desertions and marauding and to protect the Red Army’s rear 
by combatting enemy sabotage groups, tracing spies and criminal gangs, 
protecting transport routes, and organising patrol services, etc. In some 
cases, NKVD troops could be moved to the frontline (they participated 
in the defence of Leningrad and Stalingrad and took part in the fighting 
in the Caucasus). Generally, however, they followed the frontline units, 
pursuing groups of German soldiers and local collaborators. In  1943 
the Main Directorate for Military Counterintelligence Smersh (Smert 
shpionam) was established and NKVD forces subsequently also executed 
its orders.
In areas liberated from the German occupation, the NKVD acted as an 
occupying force and, inside the Soviet Union, it dealt with cleansing the 
areas ‘infected with banditry and collaboration’, including through mass 
deportations of the Karachays, Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, Crimean 
Tatars and other nations. In the years 1943–1953, the NKVD became infa‑
mous for breaking the resistance movement in Ukraine, Belarus and 
the Baltic states, and for its raids against the Polish anti ‑Communist 
underground65.
Towards the end of the Soviet period, the Internal Troops were created. 
Taken over by the Russian Federation, they lasted until 2016. A defining 
element in the founding myth of the Internal Troops had been its mis‑
sion to maintain ‘peace and quiet in the state’. For example, an anniver‑
sary edition of the formation’s commemorative album in 2011 was titled 
“Guarding peace and quiet for 200 years. A short illustrated history of the 
Internal Troops”. ‘Peace and quiet’ remains the propaganda fuel of the 
successor to the Internal Troops, Rosgvardiya.
65 For more information, see e.g.: G. Motyka, Na białych Polaków obława. Wojska NKWD 
w walce z polskim podziemiem 1944–1953, Warszawa 2014; P. Kołakowski, Pretorianie 













Appendix 2. Functions of Rosgvardiya and its predecessors
The Russian Empire: The Internal Guard protecting ‘peace and quiet’
1. Combatting and eliminating armed insurgencies and opposition to 
the tsar’s rule
2. Protecting borders and transport routes
3. Protecting order at religious sites, marketplaces, fairs, etc.
4. Convoying prisoners and deportees
5. Pursuing and arresting highwaymen and thieves
6. Pursuing fugitives and deserters
The Soviet Empire: The Cheka–GPU–NKVD–KGB forces  
‘guarding peace and the revolution’
1. Personal protection of Lenin and Stalin, the seats of the Central Com‑
mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the state bank, 
the state mint and other strategic facilities
2. Combatting opponents of Soviet rule
3. Ensuring the security of the Red Army’s rear
4. Combatting sabotage groups
5. Pursuing spies, preventing desertion and marauding
6. Combatting the anti ‑Communist underground units
7. Organising mass resettlements
8. Pacifications and zachistka, i.e. extrajudicial executions
Russian Federation: The Internal Troops, Rosgvardiya  
‘protecting order, peace and quiet’
1. Protecting the public and during mass events
2. Protecting critical infrastructure, i.e. strategic facilities and transport 
routes
3. Overseeing people holding firearms
4. Safeguarding state of emergency regimes
5. Participating in the fight against terrorism and extremism
6. Participation in territorial and civil defence
7. Pacification missions in Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, 
Dagestan, etc.
8. Pursuing and eliminating armed groups and sabotage groups
